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To explain the United States’ relatively mild response to Thailand’s 2006 and 
2014 coups d’état, this research analyzed the economic, security, and diplomatic 
conditions that existed before and after those regime-changing events. Shifts in bilateral 
relations were assessed using balance of power, alliance, and democratization theories. 
Thailand’s most recent adventures with military rule, after nearly 15 years of democracy, 
affected U.S.-Thai relations but not in ways democratization theory would predict.  
More specifically, the United States took into consideration Thailand’s stability and 
options with China, Russia, and regional partners. Therefore, balance of power theory 
offered the most convincing explanation in the security realm. The United States 
appeared to sideline its advocacy for democratization and took measured approaches to 
judiciously maintain its alliance with Thailand to preserve its strategic hegemonic 
influence in Southeast Asia. In the long run, a strong U.S.-Thailand relationship will 
maintain the United States’ influence in Southeast Asia to counterbalance emerging 
economic, security, and diplomatic threats.  
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
U.S. exceptionalism is grounded in the belief that the United States plays a unique 
and central role in spreading democracy far beyond its borders. This tenet manifests itself 
in the United States advocating for democracy “as a means to achieve security, stability, 
and prosperity for the entire world.”1 Furthermore, U.S. foreign policy aims to “identify 
and denounce regimes that deny their citizens the right to choose their leaders in elections 
that are free, fair, and transparent.”2 These policies have seen the United States 
supporting the transition to democracy in 117 countries to date.3 Analysts argue that 
democracy reduces conflict while enhancing political stability and economic prosperity.4 
President George W. Bush often stated that one reason for the war in Iraq was to promote 
democracy as a tool to combat terrorism and as a mechanism to spread democracy 
throughout the Middle East. Thus, one would expect a strong U.S. response to significant 
deviations from democracy and certainly to military coups d’état that replace democratic 
regimes with authoritarian ones. Yet U.S. reactions to Thailand’s democratic setbacks 
over the past decade have appeared surprisingly mild.5  
Thailand has long been a key U.S. ally in Asia, and historically, U.S.–Thailand 
relations have continued to strengthen despite Thailand’s lengthy coup cycle, now 
standing at 19 such events since 1932. Siam and U.S. diplomatic relations began in 1832 
                                                 
1 “Democracy,” Access 15 December 2015, U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov/j/drl/democ/. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Larry Jay Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the 
World, 1st ed. (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt and Co., 2008), 12; Uwe Sunde and Matteo Cervellati, 
“Democratizing for Peace? The Effect of Democratization on Civil Conflicts,” Oxford Economic Papers 
66, no. 3 (2013): 774. 
5 Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, and Wil Mackey, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations 
(CRS Report No. RL32593) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 3, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32593.pdf; Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 
The Impact of Coup-Related Sanctions on Thailand and Fiji: Helpful or Harmful to U.S. Relations?, First 
Session, August 1, 2007, 2.; Craig Whitlock, “U.S. Military to Participate in Major Exercise in Thailand 
Despite Coup,” Washington Post, February 7, 2015. 
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and were formalized by the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1833.6 In 1954, Thailand 
became a U.S. treaty ally, and in 2003 President George W. Bush officially designated 
Thailand as a major non-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) ally that could 
enhance security cooperation.7 This distinction put Thailand in an exclusive club of 
countries that enjoy privileges to greater U.S. foreign aid and military assistance, 
including priority delivery of defense equipment and weapons purchases. Following the 
2006 coup that removed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra from power, the U.S. 
ambassador offered a relatively mild criticism, expressing disapproval for the setback in 
democratization while carefully articulating the goals of preserving the two countries’ 
long-lasting relationship.8 After the 2014 coup, the U.S. government’s response was 
slightly harsher, with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry condemning the coup; however, 
U.S. sanctions on Thailand still allowed for significant latitude in determining how much 
assistance to maintain, reduce, or suspend.9 Indeed, the U.S.-Thailand relationship 
continues to be close economically, politically, and militarily.  
After its 1991 coup, Thailand significantly democratized its political institutions 
with less direct military influence in politics, but the two recent coups have officials, 
politicians, analysts, investors, and civil-society leaders in both Thailand and the United 
States worried about a more permanent relapse to past authoritarian, military-led 
governance. Thailand’s latest coup, in 2014, marks the country’s 19th since the 
                                                 
6 Siam became known as Thailand on 23 June 1939. 
7 Emma Chanlett-Avery, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report No. RL32593) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 14, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32593.pdf; Catharin Dalpino, “Obama in Thailand: Charting a New 
Course for the Alliance?,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, no. 188 (2012): 1–2, 
www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb188_0.pdf; Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Competing 
Diplomacies: Thailand Amidst Sino-American Rivalry,” Southeast Asian Affairs 2011, no. 1 (2011): 310, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/saa/summary/v2011/2011.chachavalpongpun.html. 
8 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ben Dolven, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report No. 
RL32593) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 8, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32593.pdf; Peter Symonds, “The U.S. And Thailand’s Military Coup,” 
International Committee of the Fourth International, 26 May 2014, 
www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/05/26/pers-m26.html?view=print. 
9 John Kerry, “Coup in Thailand,” news release, May 22, 2014, 
www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/05/226446.htm; Chanlett-Avery, Dolven, and Mackey, Thailand: 
Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report No. RL32593) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2015), 3, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32593.pdf. 
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establishment of a constitutional monarchy in 1932. The first 17 coups, between 1932 
and 1991, usually transferred power between nondemocratic governments. A long hiatus 
from 1991 to 2006 led most analysts to believe coups were a thing of the past; democracy 
was simply too robust. However, two coups and related unrest in the past decade have 
jeopardized Thailand’s political stability. Simultaneously, as a result of “rebalancing” to 
Asia, the United States is more actively seeking to sustain and enhance diplomatic and 
military cooperation with its main allies in Southeast Asia, including Thailand. Yet many 
observers consider the U.S. response to Thailand’s 2006 and 2014 coups as overly 
mild.10  
This thesis explored the ways that Thailand’s two most recent coups d’état 
affected U.S.-Thai relations. Specifically, it sought to explain why the United States did 
not exert more economic, security, or diplomatic pressure on its long-term ally to return 
to democracy. It appears that the United States has been more concerned with enforcing a 
favorable balance of power with respect to China and to a lesser degree with Russia, and 
on maintaining the U.S.-Thailand alliance, regardless of Thailand’s regime type.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
As China becomes a major power and with China showing few signs of 
democratization despite its economic liberalization since the 1980s, the United States will 
need allies in the region more than ever, particularly Thailand. Since World War II 
(WWII), the United States has, in general, supported the advancement of security, 
development, and democracy on a global level.11 This is true in Asia as well, especially, 
but not only, in the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, Myanmar, Japan, South 
Korea, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. President Barack Obama recently stated that 
“Asia will largely define whether the century ahead will be marked by conflict or 
                                                 
10 Chanlett-Avery, Dolven, and Mackey, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report No. 
RL32593) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 3, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32593.pdf; House of Representatives,  Impact of Coup-Related 
Sanctions, 2. 
11 Barack Obama, “National Security Strategy,” in The White House (2015). 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf. 
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cooperation, needless suffering or human progress.”12 This statement, which was 
intended for all of the Asia-Pacific region, resonates with Thailand. Thailand is the only 
country in mainland Southeast Asia with a relatively long history of democratization; a 
formal alliance with the United States; and common interests, economic ties, and military 
cooperation with the United States. Thailand’s status with the U.S. government continues 
to improve overall, but the direction the relationship takes will depend, in part, on how 
the U.S. government responds to Thailand’s two most recent coups and any others in the 
near to mid-future. 
Maintaining a solid U.S.-Thailand relationship is vital to U.S. national security 
strategies in the region, and understanding factors that impact this bond is critical for the 
relationship to flourish. The U.S.-Thailand relationship is symbiotic, and both sides have 
repeatedly expressed desires to maintain and enhance cooperation. While it appears that 
the 2006 and 2014 coups strained the U.S.-Thailand relationship, the United States 
remains staunchly committed to its treaty ally; however, it must also maneuver within the 
confines of the law.13 The U.S. president is required by law to impose Section 508 of the 
U.S. Foreign Operations Appropriations Act on foreign governments disposed by a 
military coup, and this act can only be lifted after “presidential certification to Congress 
that a democratically elected government had taken office in Thailand before U.S. 
assistance …[can] be resumed.”14 Constrained by legislation, the U.S. government 
temporarily suspended military aid following each coup. After the Thai election in 
December 2007, the U.S. government reinstated military funding.15 At the time of this 
thesis, elections have been postponed until a new Thai constitution is approved, and 
military aid has not resumed. However, the Obama administration, exercising discretion 
                                                 
12 “Fact Sheet: The Fiscal Year 2014 Federal Budget and the Asia-Pacific,” news release, 2013, 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/asia_pacific_rebalance_factsheet_20130412.pdf. 
13 Obama, “National Security Strategy,” in The White House, (2015), 24. 
14 House of Representatives,  Impact of Coup-Related Sanctions, 1; Lewis M. Stern, “Diverging 
Roads 21st-Century U.S.-Thai Defense Relations,” Strategic Forum, no. 241 (June 2009): 3, 
www.purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo8810. 
15 Emma Chanlett-Avery, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report No. RL32593) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 2, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32593.pdf. 
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and setting aside political objections to the 2014 coup, has decided to continue the annual 
U.S.-Thailand-led multinational military exercise, Cobra Gold.16  
Thailand’s recent coups exposed flaws in U.S. foreign policies and regulations 
that need to be reevaluated to give U.S. leaders more flexibility. For example, sanction 
laws require universal application and thus do not account for the domestic stability of a 
given country. A deeper examination of the U.S. diplomatic rhetoric versus its responses 
to Thailand’s coups reveals the true nature of the relationship, which is a shared common 
interest in stability more than in democracy. A one-size-fits-all ideologically driven 
policy response may not work to maintain the U.S. relationship with Thailand, especially 
given China’s growing influence.  
Thailand is not without options and has skillfully adapted foreign policy to take 
advantage of its relationship with great powers. Thailand has survived in a region plagued 
by a history of conflict and colonialism. Previously known as Siam, Thailand skillfully 
and diplomatically managed to avoid colonialism by Western powers in the 1800s and 
1900s, even signing a mutual defense pact with Japan during WWII to avoid being 
colonized by the Empire. Thailand considers the political conflict that led to the 2006 and 
2014 coups an internal problem that requires a Thai solution and will ask for foreign 
assistance only if needed. Despite significant democratization since 1991, Thailand 
continues to rely on royal and military intervention as a stabilizing force against extreme 
political corruption and unrest. 
A strong U.S. government pushback to the coups can result in Thailand pursuing 
an already well-established Sino-Thai relationship.17 For example, “after the legally 
mandated suspension of $24 million in U.S. military assistance precipitated by Thailand’s 
2006 coup, the Chinese provided $49 million in military assistance.”18 Thailand has 
proven itself flexible and has pursued a multitude of relationships with other states. Not 
relying on a sole international partnership benefits Thailand, but may also help other 
                                                 
16 Whitlock, “U.S. Military to Participate in Major Exercise in Thailand Despite Coup.” 
17 Sasiwan Chingchit, “After Obama’s Visit: The U.S.-Thailand Alliance and China,” Asia Pacific 
Bulletin, no. 189 (4 December 2012); 1–2. 
18 Walter Lohman, “Reinvigorating the U.S.-Thailand Alliance,” Backgrounder 2609 (26 September 
2011): 4, www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/09/reinvigorating-the-u-s-thailand-alliance. 
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countries in the region: “The fact that Thailand cultivates friendly relations with both the 
United States and China could facilitate improved relations between the two powers in 
Asia and help other Southeast Asian states to avoid having to make sharp choices.”19 On 
the other hand, a weaker U.S.-Thailand relationship could also strengthen China’s hand. 
Several theories may help explain the U.S.-Thailand relationship, nuances 
surrounding Thailand’s recent coups, and the weak U.S. response to those coups. Given 
the complex dynamics of the situation, questions remain unanswered both on a 
theoretical and practical levels. Theoretically, realists believe the international system 
exists in a natural state of anarchy, while liberals believe anarchy is best managed 
through international relations and foreign policies. International relations often create 
security dilemmas, and a state must take action and enact measures for survival. Forming 
alliances, establishing a balance of power, and spreading common political ideologies are 
methods often used to dampen the anarchic nature of the international system. In practice, 
alliances are built and sustained by mutual interest and shared ideology. Which of these 
two are more important for alliance cohesion is still unclear.  
Thailand is strongly tied to the United States in terms of its economy, diplomacy, 
and security; however, since the end of the Cold War, Thailand has increased trade, 
cooperation, and weapons purchases with China. Thailand, as a middle power, may have 
the options of a swing state, playing China and the United States off each other. Is the 
U.S. policy on democratization the top priority, or are other factors, such as regional and 
internal stability, economic growth, and balance of power, more important to U.S. 
national interests? Understanding why each state acts the way it does can help U.S. 
decision makers respond more effectively to key issues that may have negative 
implications for this critical alliance and for regional stability.  
C. BACKGROUND 
Thailand is a long-time U.S. ally and a strategic partner in the region. Thailand 
officially became a treaty ally after signing the 1954 Manila Pact of the former Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communiqué. The Cold 
                                                 
19 Chingchit, “After Obama’s Visit.” 
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War only served to deepen cooperation on all levels. In 2003, Thailand was designated a 
“major non-NATO ally” by President Bush.20 The military-to-military relationship is the 
foundation of the U.S.-Thailand alliance; Thailand allows U.S. access to Thai military 
facilities, airfields, and ports during both war and peace.21 The relationship became even 
stronger after the signing of the 2012 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defense 
Alliance.22 The Department of Defense (DOD) initiative to realign the U.S. military with 
an emphasis on the “places, not bases” concept in Southeast Asia made security 
cooperation with Thailand even more strategically important.23 Thailand offers a gateway 
to Asia; the United States provides economic opportunities, security, and military 
assistance.24 The overall perception is that both states value the alliance, and the U.S.-
Thailand relationship continues to flourish despite repeated coups. Each state’s national 
security interests appear to be the driving force that bonds the U.S.-Thailand relationship.  
Thailand had a long history of coups, a “pattern of governance [that] became 
known as the ‘vicious cycle of Thai politics.’”25 Analysts and officials came to believe 
that coups were the only way to resolve political stalemates. But in the 1990s, this steady 
                                                 
20 Chanlett-Avery, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report No. RL32593) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 8, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32593.pdf; Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ben Dolven, Thailand: 
Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report No. RL32593) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2014), 3, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32593.pdf; Dalpino, “Obama in Thailand”; 
Chachavalpongpun, “Competing Diplomacies,” 310. 
21 Chanlett-Avery and Dolven, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report No. RL32593) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 3, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32593.pdf; Paul Chambers, “U.S.-Thai Relations after 9/11: A New Era 
in Cooperation?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 26, no. 3 
(December 2004): 460–68 
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/contemporary_southeast_asia_a_journal_of_international_and_strategic_affai
rs/v026/26.3.chambers.html; Paul Chambers, “Military ‘Shadows’in Thailand since the 2006 Coup,” Asian 
Affairs: An American Review 40, no. 2 (24 May 2013): 67–82, DOI: 10.1080/00927678.2013.788413. 
22 David J. Berteau, Michael J. Green, and Zack Cooper, “Assessing the Asia-Pacific Rebalance,” 
Center for Strategic & International Studies/Rowman & Littlefield, December 2014, 
http://csis.org/publication/assessing-asia-pacific-rebalance. 
23 Chanlett-Avery, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report No. RL32593) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 8, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32593.pdf 
24 Saiyud Kerdphol, “Thai-American Friendship: Implications for U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia,” in 
Through Asian Eyes: U.S. Policy in the Asian Century, ed. Sol W. Sanders (Lanham, MD: University Press 
of America, 2001), 165–73. 
25 Miron Mushkat, “Policy Implications of Thailand’s Unexpected Coup,” International Studies 29, 
no. 2 (1992): 159. 
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pattern changed as strides were made to reduce the military’s influence on politics and 
form and strengthen democratic institutions.26 The year 1991 purportedly brought the last 
nondemocratic transfer of power, followed by 15 years of the government changing 
hands via elections instead of coups.27 Thailand’s military claimed the 1998–91 
government was corrupt and staged a military coup that led to political liberalization, but 
only after violent social unrest and royal intervention. Demonstrators fought the military, 
and soldiers fired back at the crowd; this violent clash became known as the Black May 
of 1992. King Bhumibol Adulyadej intervened in a nationally televised broadcast, calling 
both sides to face each other and compromise, with the nation’s best interests as their 
guiding priority.28 The U.S. government responded immediately following Black May by 
withdrawing troops from the joint U.S.-Thai military exercise and by suspending 
economic and military assistance, but it continued counternarcotics assistance and foreign 
military sales.29 In the aftermath, the People’s Constitution of 1997 emerged with new 
provisions for an independent media and significant changes in the parliament party list 
system that former police officer Thaksin Shinawatra would leverage in his rise to 
power.30 Ironically, “the 1997 Constitution unintentionally provided the basis for 
Thaksin’s monopolization of power and for a subsequent military response [in 2006],”31 
but for the time being, Thailand appeared to have broken out of the coup cycle.  
Thaksin Shinawatra’s meteoric rise met a sudden end in 2006. His rise to power 
had begun after he leveraged the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and advanced his family 
business, Shin Corporation, to become the largest company in Thailand. Prior to the 
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30 Erik Martinez Kuhonta, “The Paradox of Thailand’s 1997 ‘People’s Constitution’: Be Careful What 
You Wish For,” Asian Survey 48, no. 3 (2008): 374; Björn Dressel, “Thailand’s Elusive Quest for a 
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deflation of the Thai baht on 2 July 1997, Shin Corporation repaid the majority of its 
foreign debts, which caused critics to believe that Thaksin was tipped off from his 
sources within the Finance Ministry.32 In 2001, Thaksin became the first prime minister 
to complete a full term of office while concentrating political power under his Thai Rak 
Thai (TRT) Party, manifested as the Red Shirts in populist, protest-based political battles.  
The military coup that ousted Thaksin in 2006 was believed necessary and was 
welcomed by the urban middle class and the royalists. Thaksin’s opposition, the People’s 
Alliance for Democracy, known as the Yellow Shirts, viewed Thaksin as a dictator.33 In 
addition to having secured a near-monopoly on Thai media, Thaksin had cemented his 
political influence by appointing family members to key positions within the government, 
military, and police. Conservative elites feared his power, and the growing middle class 
opposed his corrupt and autocratic rule.34 Director of research and lecturer at the Institute 
of South East Asian Affairs at Chiang Mai University, Paul Chambers, concluded, “the 
only actors with sufficient political influence to effectively oppose Thaksin were the 
palace, the Privy Council, and certain senior military officials.”35  
After the 2006 coup and much public demand for royal intervention, the monarch 
urged the judiciary to resolve the deepening political crisis. As a result, the courts 
annulled elections, abolished primarily Thaksin-aligned political parties, and banned TRT 
politicians from office for five years.36 In response to foreign concerns, during a press 
conference minister of defense General Winai Phattiyakul explained to international 
reporters that “the coup was the only way to retain democracy in Thailand”37 and 
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emphasized that the coup was popular with the Thai people. Similar claims were made 
after the 2014 coup.  
The U.S. government is legally restricted in how it can respond to coups, but the 
president may exercise some discretion. U.S. officials somewhat gently condemned 
Thailand’s 2006 coup and suspended about $4.7 million in military aid, but Cobra Gold 
and aid to nonmilitary recipients continued.38 U.S. response to the 2014 coup was 
similarly weak. In light of extensive U.S. efforts to establish democracies in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, among other places, in the 2000s and 2010s, the apparent hypocrisy of the 
U.S. response to Thailand’s democratic reversals has left many questioning the 
foundation of the U.S.-Thailand relationship.39  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
An abundance of literature covers the history of the U.S.-Thailand relationship 
dating back to when the partnership began in 1832 and was formalized by the Treaty of 
Amity and Commerce in 1833. The literature delineates the relationship’s progression 
over time, culminating in Thailand’s elevated status as a non-NATO ally in 2003.40 
Government agencies, nongovernmental agencies, scholarly works, and policy 
documents provide empirical evidence and tangible data for the strong and enduring 
economic, diplomatic, and security relationship between the states. The literature outlines 
policies and laws, which mandate certain U.S. reactions to coups. Major explanations for 
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U.S.-Thailand interactions revolve around balance of power theory, alliance theory, and 
democracy-related theories.  
1. Balance of Power Theory 
Balance of power theory may be applicable to the U.S.-Thailand relationship, 
given that both states are trying to prevent an asymmetrical power distribution that favors 
China. This theory is instrumental in explaining foreign policies that are aimed at state 
self-preservation. States collectively pool resources such as people, geography, and 
weapons with other states to balance against a greater threat. The rise of China threatens 
the existing global balance of power. Analysts believe that the recent U.S. rebalance to 
Asia is really a balance against China. Some suggest that Thailand is a critical ally of the 
United States in this effort. Thailand’s geographical location, economy, and most 
importantly, its strong ties to both the United States and China make Thailand an 
important ally for the U.S. government.41 Thailand’s national security strategy involves 
not only alliances with great powers but also securing free trade agreements (FTAs) with 
major economies: Japan, China, Australia, and India. While the United States 
disapproves of Thailand’s coup, China maintains close relations and provides assistance 
to Thailand. For example, in 2011, Thailand experienced the worst flooding in half a 
century, especially its highly productive central region, devastating Thailand’s economy. 
China immediately sent $16 million in assistance, which was 17 times more than the U.S. 
relief package.42  
Balance of power theory explains why the U.S. government exercises discretion 
in maintaining and enhancing bilateral relations. The U.S.-Thailand relationship was 
further strengthened post-9/11, leading to an elevated partnership status with Thailand 
named as a major non-NATO ally.43 Thailand earned this status through its steadfast 
participation during the Korean War, Vietnam War, Cold War, Persian Gulf Wars, and 
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the global war on terrorism. Thailand sent troops during the Korean War and Vietnam 
War, and its troops suffered alongside U.S. troops. During the Vietnam War, Thailand 
allowed the United States to operate air campaigns to Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Lao 
PDR from Thailand. During the Cold War, Thailand was the key anti-Communist ally in 
Southeast Asia. More recently, access to Thai ports and airfields has allowed a strategic 
flow of troops and equipment to the Middle East and South Asia for Desert Shield, Desert 
Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom. The U.S. government 
maintains a diplomatic and military partnership that continues to solidify despite setbacks 
in Thailand’s democratization process, suggesting that the U.S. government values 
having a reliable, stable ally over a democratic one.   
2. Alliance Theory 
States respond to threats by forming alliances to counter a common threat or by 
bandwagoning with the threat.44 Stephen M. Walt defines alliance as a “formal or 
informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”45 
This definition is a quid pro quo in that each party gives something toward the 
relationship in exchange for compensation.46 Thailand successfully executed both 
alliance formation and bandwagoning to avoid Western colonialism, Japanese 
occupation, and communist expansion and continues this foreign policy model today. In 
the process, Thailand ceded territorial rights, forged alliances with great powers, and 
played alliances with great powers for its survival.  
Alliance theory makes practical sense, resonating with both states’ national 
security interests. The U.S.-Thailand alliance started with the 1954 Manila Pact of 
SEATO and the Thanat-Rusk communiqué of 1962.47 Thailand was a developing state 
that benefited from the great-power protection of the United States, leading many to 
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equate the U.S.-Thailand relationship as a phi noong or older-younger brother 
relationship.48 For Thailand, having a great-power ally proved useful in warding off 
enemies. The U.S.-Thailand alliance has been significantly shaped by the Cold War, most 
notably the threat of communism from its northern neighbor, China; its eastern neighbors, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR); and an internal 
insurgency.  
During the Cold War, the U.S. government provided financial and military 
assistance to Thailand. In return, Thailand became a key anti-Communist state in the 
region with the support of the United States.49 Security cooperation and economic aid 
during the Vietnam War deepened the relationship and turned Thailand into an 
indispensable ally. Thailand contributed troops and “hosted a massive U.S. presence 
based on U.S.-built airfields, an important deep-water port at Sattahip, and a military 
communications infrastructure that became a critical support and logistics base for 
conducting the war in Indochina.”50 U.S. interest in Southeast Asia was high, and in 
return Thailand’s military received U.S. military training under the International Military 
Education Training (IMET), as well as weapons and equipment through the foreign 
military sales (FMS) program.51  
The U.S. government’s decision to end the Vietnam War in the early 1970s left 
Thai officials feeling deserted and vulnerable; in response, Thailand immediately limited 
U.S. military access to airfields and ports.52 From Thailand’s perspective, its major ally 
and big brother abandoned them.53 As a result, Thailand normalized relations with China, 
and currently the Sino-Thai relationship remains strong, giving Thailand solid alliance 
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options.54 The U.S.-Thailand relationship rekindled in 1978 when Vietnam invaded 
Cambodia, Thailand’s immediate neighbor. Throughout these decades of violent, political 
conflict, the United States invested heavily in modernizing and equipping the Royal Thai 
Military.55 In 1982, Cobra Gold commenced and, despite occasional postponements and 
scale-downs in size, the exercise continues uninterrupted and robust.56  
Major events in the 1990s brought more challenges. In 1991, these included the 
Persian Gulf War, the end of the Cold War, and Thailand’s 17th coup since 1932. 
Legislatively mandated reactions tested the U.S.-Thailand relationship. The Asian 
financial crisis of 1997 would challenge alliance theory and the U.S. commitment to aid 
its ally during a time of need. This crisis stemmed from the Thai government’s decision 
to keep the Thai baht inflated during an overheated real estate bubble; international 
investment speculators attacked the Thai baht, leading to a contagion effect that severely 
impacted the global economy. Many Thais considered the U.S. response to the financial 
crisis as too little, too late and as focused primarily on U.S. investors.57 Thailand reached 
out for economic assistance prior to the crisis, but the Clinton administration refrained 
from intervening.58 Once again, Thailand felt let down by the United States.59 In contrast, 
China refused to devalue its currency, and Thailand turned to financial support with 
stringent terms from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).60 The aftermath of the 
Asian financial crisis left many Thais skeptical of the U.S. commitment.61  
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3. Democratization and Democratic Peace Theories 
The United States advocates for democracy as a means to promote peace and 
stability, but sometimes those three concepts are incompatible. Democratization theory 
holds that democracies tend to avoid going to war with other democracies, respect human 
rights, and prefer peaceful resolutions.62 A military coup is considered a step backward 
from democracy. The weak U.S. response to the 2006 and 2014 coups might have applied 
calculated pressure on Thailand to return quickly to democracy without severing the 
relationship. Yet, a Western model of democracy may not be the best fit for Thailand. In 
response to Thailand’s coups, the U.S. government suspended bilateral assistance 
programs, but it continues to provide assistance for “democracy promotion, disaster 
assistance, counterterrorism, counternarcotic, trafficking in persons, and refugee 
assistance programs.”63 Believing that major non-NATO ally status should be reserved 
for democracies, Congress introduced the Thailand Democracy Act that proposed 
removing Thailand’s preferred status.64 The president did not ratify the act after the 2006 
coup, and it is unlikely the current administration will revoke Thailand’s status in light of 
the subsequent coup. Instead, President Obama decided to continue with Cobra Gold in 
2015 and 2016, sending the message that while the United States advocates for 
democracy, it values security cooperation and stability more.65 
Thaksin used the crisis to rally popular support from the rural poor and 
consolidate political power in parliament. Prior to the 2006 coup, Thailand was 
recovering from the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and it adopted a new constitution as a 
result of the 1991 coup and Black May violence. The new constitution was an attempt to 
end serious corruption and the coup cycle. According to Thai scholar Thitinan 
Pongsudhirak, “The 1997 Constitution was designed to promote transparency and 
accountability of the political system and the stability and effectiveness of the 
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government.”66 Instead, the new political rules cultivated Thaksin’s rise to and 
consolidation of power. First, Thaksin won over the rural poor through populist policies: 
income redistribution, government activism, and policy innovation. Since the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, Thailand’s economy rebounded in remarkable fashion, and it repaid the 
IMF rescue debt four years ahead of schedule. Thaksin led the TRT Party with the aim to 
rally those hit hard by the financial crisis: “Thaksinomics combined the venerable East 
Asian export model’s emphasis on mass manufacturing spearheaded by foreign direct 
investment with initiatives to stimulate smaller business that leveraged indigenous skills 
and resources.”67 Thailand’s economy continues to grow by expanding foreign direct 
investment (FDI) from Japan, China, and South Korea.68  
Thailand now has a solid economy and exhibits significant regional influence. In 
2013, the United States was Thailand’s number one export market; in turn, Thailand 
became the United States’ 24th largest trading partner, totaling $38 billion in bilateral 
trades.69 Thailand, a key founder of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), is considered by many analysts to be a buffer state between China and the 
United States.70 Thailand expressed interest in joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) and initiated negotiations for an FTA with the United States. A strong U.S.-Thai 
partnership could hedge against China’s growing influence in the region.71  
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Thailand rebounded from the Asian financial crisis to become a key player and 
influence in the region, but its reputation has been tarnished by internal political 
instability. This instability resulted in the 2006 and 2014 coups and has complicated and 
strained U.S.-Thailand relations. Some U.S. government officials believe the September 
2006 coup was a necessary evil strongly supported by key sectors of Thai society; as a 
result, the U.S. State Department exercised leniency while imposing sanctions.72 Donald 
A. Manzullo, a State of Illinois representative in Congress, prepared a statement for a 
hearing on the impact of coup-related sanctions on Thailand: “The implementation of 
Section 508 sanctions on military cooperation with Thailand is truly unfortunate because 
of the closeness of the United States-Thai relationship. However, despite the strong ties 
that bind our nations, we must send a clear signal that the U.S. opposes the use of military 
force to overthrow a democratically elected government.”73 Some U.S. government 
officials believe that the inconsistent policy needs to be reevaluated.  
Levels of cooperation had recovered significantly before the 2014 coup. 
Following the 2014 coup, the U.S. response was harsher than it had been in 2006. The 
United States responded by suspending aid targeted primarily at military assistance and 
exercises, totaling an estimated $10.5 million.74 Secretary of State John Kerry urged 
Thailand to return immediately to democracy, noted negative implications for assistance, 
and emphasized the value of the military relationship.75 The U.S. government response to 
Thailand’s coups remains a consistent disapproval, offering Bangkok leaders assistance 
to help reestablish democracy and continued military cooperation if not financial aid.  
China has come through for Thailand during times of crisis. During the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997, China refused to devalue its currency and offered financial 
support. Thai public opinion matters and, although U.S.-Thailand relations solidified 
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during the Cold War and further bolstered post-9/11, Thailand also has strong traditional, 
economical, and political ties with China. Thailand is considered a potential battleground 
for great-power influence and a key mediator in the region for stability.76 For instance, 
following President Barack Obama’s visit to Thailand in 2012, anti-Thaksin Thai media 
expressed concerns that the U.S. rebalance toward Asia could hinder Sino-Thailand 
relations and cause instability in the region.77  
The U.S. government has walked a fine line in dealing with Thailand’s 
democratic setbacks over the years. In 1982, Cobra Gold began as a bilateral exercise 
between the American and Thai militaries, subsequently growing into the largest annual 
Asia-Pacific multinational military exercise.78 The U.S. government’s suspension of 
Cobra Gold following the 1992 Black May seemed to signal U.S. support by turning a 
political blind eye.79 While certain aid was immediately suspended to Thailand following 
the 2006 coup, the U.S. government maintained military support, exercises, and training 
under the IMET program without interruption.80 In 2015, Cobra Gold recorded 
participation from 30 countries but was scaled down in response to the 2014 coup. The 
message was clear that the United States disapproves of the coup but desires to preserve 
the U.S.-Thailand relationship as a key link in its rebalancing to Asia.  
4. Conclusion 
The United States has a strong security, economic, and political interest in the 
Southeast Asia region and considers Thailand a critical ally. Balance of power theory, 
and to a less but still significant extent alliance theory, best explained the U.S. reaction to 
Thailand’s most recent coups. Democratization theory, on the other hand, did not appear 
significant, at least in the short-term. While Thais value the relationship and alliance, 
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Thailand considers its political conflict an internal matter that can only be solved by a 
Thai solution and without foreign interference. Thailand has long demonstrated a flexible 
survival characteristic that has helped it resist colonialism and communism. Thailand has 
shown it will exercise other alliance and balance of power options when U.S. rhetoric and 
commitment waivers. The multi-aligned foreign policy approach and strong ties with 
both the United States and China could allow Thailand to facilitate relations between the 
great powers and maintain stability in the region that is consistent with the U.S. strategic 
plan to rebalance to Asia.81  
Coups disrupt democracy, but in the case of Thailand, coups serve a purpose of 
maintaining stability within the state. While the United States prefers liberal democracy 
in its allies, it recognizes that stability is in both the U.S. and Thailand’s interest. 
Thailand may be “addicted” to coups, relying on extra-constitutional royal or military 
intervention to dampen political conflict.82 Thai people have come to expect united royal-
military intervention to solve Thailand’s political conflict, a concept that is foreign to the 
Western world but tends to work in Thailand.83 Thailand’s King Bhumibol Adulyadej is 
not only the longest reigning king but is beloved and considered god-like. While the 
king’s health continues to deteriorate, his potential successor is unlikely to command the 
same admiration and loyalty from the Thais. Thus, Thailand will need to resolve future 
political crises through democratic and constitutional means. The journey back to 
democracy may be a lengthy process for Thailand. 
As in any relationship, each side will have to compromise for the U.S.-Thailand 
relationship to endure. Both sides understand how the coups strained their relationship, 
but the actions taken resonate more than rhetoric. How strictly the U.S. government 
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exercises policies and administrative response to the coups will matter. Thai elites are 
skeptical about the virtues of the U.S. rebalance to Asia, considering it too 
confrontational toward China and potentially troublesome for Thai national interest.84 
How far the U.S. government pushes Thailand toward democratization through 
punishment with sanctions will resonate strongly and could drive Thailand toward China.  
E. HYPOTHESES AND EXPLANATIONS 
States utilize various methods for self-preservation. Countries form alliances, 
balance power, and push their ideological objectives using economic, political, and 
military ties. States that are similar and have shared ideology tend to gravitate toward one 
another. This is true with the United States and Thailand. For example, both are known as 
countries of freedom. Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia that was never 
colonized. Moreover, it has a track record of aligning with great powers for self-
preservation through economic interdependence and through investment in military and 
political shared interests.  
Similar to U.S. interest in the Middle East, critics often state that U.S. interest in 
Thailand is for natural resources, particularly oil, but this does not seem to be the case. 
Thailand’s gross domestic product (GDP) centers around services, industry, and 
agriculture. Additionally, Thailand has routinely had a strong economy due to industry 
and agriculture exports such as rice, rubber, sugar, precious stones, computer parts, and 
other machinery parts. Thailand ranks 30th in the world in crude oil production, 49th in 
export, and 14th in import of crude oil.85 Approximately 80 percent of Thailand’s crude 
oil originates offshore in the Gulf of Thailand.86 With the exception of refined petroleum, 
Thailand imports and consumes more natural energy resources than it exports.87 As a 
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result, Thailand’s oil contributes only a fraction of the 3 percent of other sources in U.S. 
oil import.88  
It appears that economic ties show mixed results but fail to explain a weak U.S. 
response to Thailand’s coup. The United States is Thailand’s third largest trading partner 
and foreign direct investor totaling more than $37 billion in trade and $13 billion in 
FDI.89 Thailand offers lower-cost goods and a relatively educated, cheaper workforce for 
foreign investment. However, Thailand’s political instability and corruption can make 
investing in the Kingdom unattractive, and the United States has other options for import 
partners. Neither state’s economy is dependent on the other since each enjoys diversified 
trade with other states.  
International relations theories might offer a better explanation for the weak U.S. 
response to the coup question but still have flaws. The United States would lose 
creditability as a supporter of democratization if it did not condemn Thailand’s coup, and 
one would expect a stronger U.S. response to the 2006 and 2014 coups. During the Cold 
War, Thailand was the only democracy on the mainland, and it became a beacon for 
democratization in the region. When the U.S. makes declarations in international fora, 
such as the United Nations, having another ally gives its motions greater legitimacy. 
Thailand has traditionally supported the United States on the international stage, such as 
during the Gulf Wars and the global war on terrorism. However, a strong U.S. response 
could backfire.  
The most likely answer to the major research question is that the United States has 
a greater and more familiar military-to-military than a political or economic relationship 
with Thailand. Before 1991, the U.S.-Thailand alliance blossomed despite Thailand’s 
being under a politically active constitutional monarchy and showing strong military 
influence in politics. It was not until after the 1991 coup that Thailand exhibited a stable 
civilian elected political system. Thailand has been a strong supporter and critical ally for 
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U.S. initiatives in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the war on drugs, but it is exercising caution 
regarding the South China Sea disputes.90 During the Vietnam War, Persian Gulf Wars, 
and humanitarian relief efforts in the region, Thailand’s airports and seaports proved vital 
to U.S. strategic plans. Thailand hosts, along with U.S. troops, the largest military 
exercise in Asia. One can reason that the military alliance is the U.S. government’s top 
priority and that a severed relationship would tip the balance of Thailand’s resources to 
China. Correspondingly, after the 2014 coup, Daniel R. Russel, a senior U.S. diplomat, 
became the highest-ranking official to visit Thailand, showing the U.S. commitment to 
Thailand despite the coup.91 
Alliance and balance of power theories may better explain U.S. reactions to 
Thailand’s two most recent coups than does democratization theory. The United States 
values other factors more than democracy, such as loyalty to its military alliances, 
maintaining balance of power against China, and capitalizing on Thailand’s geography. 
This thesis suggests that stability and balance of power against China are considerably 
more important to the United States than democratization, at least in the context studied 
here.  
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A systematic analysis of the conditions and policies that existed before and after 
each coup was required to understand how Thailand’s 2006 and 2014 coups impacted 
U.S.-Thailand relations and why relations shifted as they did. This thesis conducted a 
comparative study of Thailand’s 2006 and 2014 coups by reviewing and analyzing 
literature, official government statements, and actions of both the United States and 
Thailand before and after each coup, covering the timeframe from Thaksin’s landslide 
victory in the 2005 elections to May 2016, two full years after the last coup. The area of 
focus was limited to economic, security, and diplomatic ties between the United States 
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and Thailand with some discussion of Sino-Thai, Russo-Thai, and ASEAN relations in 
these three realms.  
There is a common understanding of what a coup d’état is, but even the most 
comprehensive definition must be clarified. The term coup d’état originated in the mid-
17th century in France meaning “a violent and immediate seizure of state power, usually 
by armed forces, and with the implication of being undemocratic and unconstitutional.”92 
A key part of this definition is that a coup d’état entails a change in government, usually 
carried out by the military even if not violent. The change in government is sudden and 
significant with violence or the threat of violence coming from the military or other 
concentrations of power.93 The implication of Thailand’s being undemocratic and 
unconstitutional is that changes in government are carried out illegally, not through 
formal institutional means such as elections or impeachment. The ruling regime, 
authoritarian or democratic, can change or remain the same, such as from one 
authoritarian regime to another, as was the case with most of Thailand’s 17 twentieth-
century coups. Political elites and important elements in the military often support or plan 
the coup. Thailand’s pattern of governance and coups has been labeled as the “vicious 
cycle of Thai politics,”94 or coup cycle. First, this cycle begins with a coup where the 
military intervenes in politics. Next, the coup often results in the dissolving of both the 
constitution and parliament in addition to the suspension of political parties. Then the 
military reconstructs parliament with military or allied personnel until elections resume. 
The new government often experiences a “honeymoon” period until another crisis sparks, 
requiring another coup to intervene.95 As a result of the coup cycle, Thailand has 
bounced between authoritarianism and democracy.  
Democratization is a process and not an event. According to Terry Lynn Karl and 
Philippe Schmitter, “Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which 
rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting 
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indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representative.”96 
Hence, democratization is “the process of becoming a democracy.”97 More specifically, 
democracy includes free and fair elections, free media, transparency, and accountability 
through a system of checks and balances. Further, the government is structured with a 
division of power between judicial, executive, and legislative bodies. Democratization 
takes time and often experiences setbacks.  
The sources necessary to understand the U.S.-Thailand economic, security, and 
political relationships include official policy statements, hearings, and reports from the 
following: U.S. foreign policy documents and press releases, the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the World Bank, the IMF, the 
Economist, the Wall Street Journal, and the Far Eastern Economic Review. In addition to 
the listed sources that overlap with economic relations, diplomatic political sources 
include documents from the U.S. Department of State, the Congressional Research 
Service, the U.S. Embassy in Thailand, the New York Times, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand. Security-related sources and data include the Joint 
United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) Thailand, FMS data, non-NATO ally 
status and privileges law and policy statements, IMET records, Department of State travel 
warnings, and the number and constitution of military personnel in the U.S. Embassy and 
consulates. Finally, interviews with personnel from the Asia Foundation in San 
Francisco, JUSMAG Thailand, and the Naval Postgraduate School International Graduate 
Programs Office seek answers about facts, not viewpoints.  
G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis was organized as follows. Chapter I framed the major research 
question and established the significance of how and why Thailand’s 2006 and 2014 coup 
affected the U.S.-Thailand relationship. This included history on Thailand and on the 
partnership that began over 182 years ago and steadily deepened over time. Chapter II 
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explored the U.S.-Thailand relationship that existed before and after Thailand’s 2006 
coup. This chapter was broken down into three sections focusing on economic ties, 
security arrangements, and diplomatic relations. Each of the three sections considered 
conditions that existed pre- and post-coup. Chapter III explored the U.S.-Thailand 
relationship that existed before and after the 2014 coup; the sections and subsections 
were divided in the same format as those in Chapter II. Chapter IV provided a 
comparative analysis of the economic, diplomatic, and security conditions both before 
and after the 2006 and 2014 coups. Chapter V summarized the findings, explained the 
implications to the relationship and theory, and offered recommendations for U.S. foreign 
policy toward Thailand and Asia more generally.  
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II. 2006 COUP 
The formal relationship of the United States with Thailand is older than the U.S. 
relationship with any other country in Asia. This partnership first began in 1833 with the 
Treaty of Amity and Commerce and later developed with Thailand’s becoming a formal 
treaty ally in 1954 under the Manila Pact of SEATO and the 1962 Thanat-Rusk 
communiqué. The relationship has strengthened across the instruments of national power: 
economic, political, and military security cooperation. In the early 2000s, Thailand was 
rewarded for demonstrating enhanced commitment to the U.S. global war on terrorism. 
U.S.-Thailand relations appeared to strengthen after 9/11 but were then interrupted by 
Thailand’s 2006 coup. The United States formally disapproved of Thailand’s democratic 
setback and struggled to maintain the relationship while imposing legislatively mandated 
military aid suspension. However, after Thailand reestablished a democratically elected 
civilian government, the United States resumed military aid and continued strong 
bilateral economic, political, and security cooperation. Some initiatives changed as a 
result of the coup, but those changes were not significant enough to terminate or even 
substantially harm the relationship.  
A. ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
The United States and Thailand have a long history of economic relations that are 
mutually beneficial. In 1833, they signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, and in 
1966, the Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations was updated to grant economic access 
to each country’s market. In 2004, the United States and Thailand initiated negotiations 
for an FTA.98 Thailand’s GDP on a purchasing power parity (PPP) is the second largest 
in Southeast Asia after Indonesia, making Thailand an attractive market for the United 
States. The United States was Thailand’s largest export market in 2005 and the 
Kingdom’s fourth largest trading partner behind ASEAN, Japan, and the European Union 
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(EU).99 FDI connects and typically improves both the recipient and investing economy. 
Since Thailand’s economy depends heavily on foreign investment, Thailand fosters a 
nurturing environment for foreign investors. Specifically, the revised Treaty of Amity 
and Commerce favors U.S. investors above all other foreign investors. This section will 
describe their pre- and post-coup economic relationship relating to FTA negotiations, 
bilateral trade, and FDI, demonstrating that the 2006 coup did not have a negative effect 
on the U.S.-Thailand economic relationship overall, despite some posturing and 
roadblocks. 
1. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
Trade relations between the United States and Thailand gained momentum in 
recent decades due to the proven resiliency of Thailand’s economy and despite successful 
coups in 1980 and 1991 and a failed coup attempt in 1985. Indeed, in the 1980s and 
1990s, Thailand had one of the world’s fastest growing economies.100 Its economy 
developed quickly along with several other “Asian Tigers,” such as South Korea and 
Taiwan, but suffered a devastating crisis in 1997–98. Following the crisis, Thailand’s 
economy was stabilized by stipulations of economic reforms designed to restore 
confidence by establishing a strong regulation framework and a $17.2 billion loan from 
IMF.101 By 2003, Thailand appeared to have fully recovered from the Asian financial 
crisis and repaid its outstanding obligations under the IMF four years ahead of 
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schedule.102 This rapid recovery demonstrated the strength, resilience, and attractiveness 
of Thailand as a trade partner.  
In 2002, the two countries signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement 
(TIFA) that set the foundation for a bilateral FTA.103 On 19 October 2003, President 
George W. Bush and Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra began concerted negotiations 
on a U.S.-Thailand FTA that would promote exports and protect investments.104 
Subsequently, they conducted five rounds of negotiations and anticipated a signed 
agreement sometime in 2006.105 The FTA appeared favorable and tenable, but in April 
2006, just six months prior to the September coup, the Thai government suspended 
negotiations to focus on contentious domestic politics.  
The 2006 coup changed the direction of the FTA, but this change did not 
significantly affect either country’s economy. Immediately following the coup, U.S. trade 
officials announced that FTA negotiations would not continue until Thailand returned to 
democracy.106 Neither country reengaged FTA discussions; however, in August 2006, the 
United States signed a TIFA with ASEAN, which included Thailand. Both countries 
continued to sign FTAs with other partners, with a greater emphasis on multilateral 
agreements, such as TPP and ASEAN FTAs.107 In 2007, the Thai Office of Commercial 
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Affairs announced that the U.S.-Thailand FTA negotiations were delayed indefinitely.108 
This development lay in sharp contrast to Thailand’s trade agreements with other states. 
For instance, Thailand secured agreements with countries including Bahrain, China, 
India, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Peru between 2002 and 2011, and continued to 
aggressively pursue FTAs with South Korea, Chile, and the EU to increase trading 
opportunities.109 After the U.S.-Thailand FTA negotiations were put on hold by Thailand, 
Thailand’s economy continued to expand. Thailand’s overall economic situation in 2007 
continued on an upward trend. According to the Bank of Thailand, the country’s export-
oriented model remained strong with a 4.9 percent GDP growth rate in 2007, which 
slowed to 2.6 percent growth in 2008, in large part because of the global economic 
crisis.110  
Although FTA negotiations were halted, U.S.-Thailand trade did not appear to 
change after the 2006 coup. Thailand relies heavily on trade, but as indicated in Figure 1, 
Thailand’s economic growth between 2000 and 2010 was not affected by the coup. GDP 
is one of the primary metrics used to measure the health of a country’s overall economy, 
representing the total dollar value of all goods and services over a period of time.111 The 
data in Figure 1 were drawn from Trading Economics’ online database, which was 
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selected because it included historical data captured from the World Bank Group. 
Thailand’s GDP trajectory improved consistently during this decade.112 The 2006 coup 
appeared to have no impact on Thailand’s economic growth, and the only significant 
decline occurred after the global financial crisis of 2008. The coup ended U.S.-Thailand 
FTA negotiations but appears not to have hindered economic growth or trade relations.  
Figure 1.  Thailand Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 2000–2010.113  
 
The dashed bar represents the 2006 coup.  
2. Bilateral Trade  
As noted, the United States and Thailand have a strong and lasting economic 
relationship centered on bilateral trade that mutually benefits both states. Bilateral trade 
benefits each country in different ways. For Thailand, bilateral trade increases economic 
competitiveness and the market share of Thai goods. For the United States, Thailand is 
appealing because it is the second largest economy in Southeast Asia and an important 
transit point for markets in Thailand’s neighboring countries. Thailand was also a 
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founding member of ASEAN, which was formed to counter the spread of communism in 
Southeast Asia and to promote political and economic cooperation and regional stability. 
In the years leading up to the coup, U.S.-Thailand bilateral trade grew annually 
between 1997 and 2006. In 2000, the total bilateral trade appeared to peak at $23 billion, 
but then it continued to improve in 2004, 2005, and 2006 with total trade values of $23.9 
billion, $27.1 billion, and $30.3 billion, respectively.114 In 2005, the United States was 
Thailand’s largest export destination, and U.S.-Thailand bilateral trade continued to 
strengthen with solid annual increases. In 2005, Thailand was the United States’ 23rd 
largest trading partner; the United States was Thailand’s fourth largest trading partner.115  
Bilateral trade between Thailand and the United States, Japan, and China from 
2000 to 2010 is illustrated in Figure 2. This data were drawn from the Observatory of 
Economic Complexity’s (OEC) online database. While the figures from the U.S. Census 
Bureau are somewhat different, the trends with the United States are similar but did not 
include bilateral trade between other states and Thailand. The OEC database was selected 
for consistency when comparing countries. The bilateral trade lines represent the sum of 
imports and exports between Thailand and its partners. Overall, bilateral trade between 
Thailand and all of these countries steadily increased from 2000 to 2010. The Asian 
financial crisis of 1997 and Thailand’s road to recovery appeared to slow trade from 2000 
to 2002. However, after Thailand’s early repayment of its debt to the IMF, bilateral trade 
grew at a steady rate. After the coup in 2006, trade appeared to accelerate from 2007 to 
2010, with a minor setback during the global financial crisis in 2008. In fact, the 2008 
global financial crisis appears to have had a much greater impact on U.S.-Thailand 
bilateral trade relations than the 2006 coup.  
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Figure 2.  Thailand’s Bilateral Trade with Top Partners, 2000–2010116 
 
The dashed vertical line represents Thailand’s 2006 coup.  
Thailand’s bilateral trade with the United States may have temporarily plateaued 
in 2006, but, on balance, it was not negatively affected by the coup. Indeed, one 
justification for the coup was to restore stability, investor confidence, and economic 
production after months of escalating and sometimes violent standoffs between the Red 
Shirt and Yellow Shirt protestors.117 Following the 2006 coup, U.S.-Thailand economic 
trade relations, for the most part, remained positive, and bilateral trade continued to 
increase. Figure 3 shows that U.S.-Thailand bilateral trade increased to $31.1 billion in 
2007 and $32.6 billion in 2008.118 This data were drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau 
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online database, and the trend line represents the sum of imports and exports between the 
United States and Thailand. Trade continued to rise from 2006 to 2008, albeit at a slower 
rate than the previous five years. According to the U.S. State Department, in 2007, the 
United States became Thailand’s largest export destination while Thailand was the 
United States’ 27th-largest export destination, a drop of only three places from 2005. 
Bilateral trade showed positive signs of growth until the global financial crisis.  
Figure 3.  U.S.-Thailand Bilateral Trade 2000–2010119 
 
The dashed vertical line represents Thailand’s 2006 coup.  
3. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)  
Since 1833, with the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, the United 
States and Thailand have shared strong economic relations that favor U.S. investors over 
other foreign investors. Thailand’s economy significantly depends on FDI, and the 
United States has incentives for its investors under the Treaty of Amity and Economic 
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Relations.120 In 1966, just prior to the intense escalation of U.S. involvement in the 
Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson visited Thailand and agreed to the new Treaty 
of Amity and Economic Relations that granted both U.S. and Thai investors, with limited 
exceptions, “national treatment” when conducting business in the partner country.121 
Simply, the treaty offers preferential treatment only extended to U.S. investors. U.S. 
investors can operate businesses in Thailand with equal rights as Thai businesses and are 
exempt from most of the restrictions imposed by Thailand’s Alien Business Law of 
1972.122 Additionally, the treaty grants both U.S. and Thai investors considerable access 
to one another’s economic markets.123 During his terms of office from 2001 to 2006, 
Prime Minister Thaksin employed a dual track economic policy that combined domestic 
stimulus with the time-proven foreign trade and investment strategy. According to the 
American Chamber of Commerce, the United States was the second largest foreign 
investor in Thailand prior to the 2006 coup.124  
Figure 4 shows U.S. FDI in Thailand from 2000 to 2010. These data were 
extracted from the Bank of Thailand’s online database. While the figures from ASEAN’s 
Statistical Yearbook are somewhat different, the trends are similar. The ASEAN 
secretariat collects data from country bank submission and national statistical offices 
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through the ASEAN Working Group on International Investment. The Bank of Thailand 
database was chosen because it was the direct source of information. Throughout the 
year, investors move money in and out of companies in Thailand, and Figure 4 shows the 
year-end annual difference. The U.S. dollar amount is positive when the inflow exceeds 
outflow. Although investments from 2000 to 2002 were a net positive, U.S. investors 
appeared cautious and invested less each year. After repaying its rescue debt ahead of 
schedule, Thailand appeared to be a favorable investment destination, and U.S. FDI 
resumed upward from $182.34 million in 2002 to $750.48 million in 2005.125 Political 
instability in 2006 leading up to the September coup appeared to hinder investment, but 
FDI inflow still remained positive for the year and nearly returned to pre-coup levels in 
2007.  
Figure 4.  U.S. FDI inflow to Thailand from 2000–2010126 
 
The dashed bar represents the 2006 coup. 
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Events leading up to the coup created instability, especially in Bangkok, that 
appears to have constrained U.S. FDI in Thailand in 2006. However, after the military 
stabilized domestic affairs in the fourth quarter, investment flourished until the global 
financial crisis in 2008. Although FDI declined in 2006, U.S. investors still favored 
Thailand, and FDI remained positive at $165.78 million. According to the World Trade 
Organization, the United States contributed 8 percent of Thailand’s overall FDI in 2006, 
a share that has held relatively steady throughout the 2000s.127 The volume of 
transactions associated with the increase in investment in 2006 was higher than that 
associated with the decrease in investment, meaning more U.S. investment went into 
Thailand than came out.  
Following the coup, the interim government attempted to impose control 
measures that might have had a negative impact on foreign investors. The military 
government imposed measures, which it later reversed, that would restrict foreign 
ownership in Thai companies.128 These policies stemmed from criticism generated by the 
sale of the Thaksin family’s telecommunication company to a Singaporean state-owned 
enterprise. Large international drug companies, several of which are U.S. owned, 
responded negatively to news of the restrictions, causing the interim government to 
cancel the change, and U.S. companies continued to directly invest in Thailand. Figure 4 
shows an increase to $623.92 million in U.S. FDI in 2007, strongly suggesting the coup 
did not have a significant effect on U.S. investors.  
After returning to a civilian elected government, Thailand remained a favorable 
investment destination for U.S. investors, but the global financial crisis of 2008 had a 
great impact, causing investors to pull money out of Thailand. In 2008 and 2009, U.S. 
investors withdrew $214.5 million and $339.37 million, respectively. However, by 2010, 
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Thailand was again a favorable place for U.S. investors with U.S. FDI increasing to 
$516.94 million. The data suggests the global financial crisis had a greater impact than 
the 2006 coup on U.S. FDI in Thailand. 
B. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS  
Security cooperation between the United States and Thailand is deep rooted and 
resilient, despite recent challenges. Thailand has been considered one of the major U.S. 
security allies in Southeast Asia for over 50 years. SEATO’s 1954 Manila Pact, which 
was created at the behest of the United States, and the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communiqué 
solidified the two states’ military security cooperation. The relationship was built on the 
foundation of anti-communism, as Thailand was the region’s central anti-Communist ally 
during the Vietnam and Cold Wars. The U.S.-Thailand bilateral Cobra Gold annual 
exercise began to showcase combined military force capabilities against Vietnam during 
the Cold War. Both countries’ security interests were aligned, and both cooperated 
against a common enemy. Vietnam’s 1978 invasion and decade-long occupation of 
Cambodia, Thailand’s direct neighbor, only served to solidify the U.S.-Thailand security 
partnership, especially given the USSR’s support for Vietnam’s aggression.129 After the 
Cold War, transnational security problems, from drug trafficking to terrorism, became the 
most salient common threats.  
In the 2000s, the U.S. and Thailand security relations continued to strengthen and 
align against terrorism. The events of 9/11, in combination with Thailand’s support 
against terrorism in Southeast Asia, enhanced U.S.-Thailand security relations. During 
the Persian Gulf Wars and global war on terrorism, Thailand allowed strategic U.S. 
military access to ports and airfields in Thailand that helped maintain a critical logistics 
flow of troops, equipment, and supplies both in and out of theater.130 In 2003, President 
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George W. Bush designated Thailand a major non-NATO ally.131 This distinction placed 
Thailand in an exclusive group of nations that enjoys especially close defense 
cooperation, such as favored conditions for purchase of weapons and military aid. 
Additionally, Thailand served as a logistics hub for U.S. and international relief efforts 
after the 2004 tsunami.  
Security cooperation has been the strongest pillar of the U.S.-Thailand relationship. 
This section explores the security cooperation displayed by Cobra Gold, the IMET 
program, the FMS program, and the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) 
and concludes that legally mandated suspension of military aid did not sever the U.S.-
Thailand security relationship.  
1. Cobra Gold  
Training exercises enhance coordination and cooperation between nations, and 
Cobra Gold has grown to become the largest multilateral exercise in the Asia-Pacific 
region, boasting seven members and 20 observers in 2015.132 Cobra Gold’s origins  
can be traced back to the 1965 bilateral U.S.-Thailand naval exercise Operation 
TEAMWORK that included surface and antisubmarine, underwater demolition, mine 
warfare, and amphibious operations with U.S. Marines and Royal Thai Marines.133 
Operation TEAMWORK was a demonstration of force and security cooperation among 
allies against Vietnam. It provided the framework for the inaugural annual exercises that 
began in 1982 and combined several naval exercises into what came to be known as 
Cobra Gold.134 The first Cobra Gold included four armed forces branches: Royal Thai 
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Navy, Royal Thai Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps. In 1984, the U.S. Army 
participated in Cobra Gold, and since 1990, the role of the exercise’s executive agent has 
alternated between the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) and the U.S. Marine Corps 
Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC). Over 13,000 military personnel participated in the 2015 
exercises.135 
In the 1990s, with most Cold War threats ebbing, Cobra Gold not only survived a 
possible disruption but also continued to expand with new members and observers. In 
1991, Royal Thai Army commander-in-chief General Suchinda Kraprayoon overthrew 
the Thai government in a coup, but after considering suspension of the exercise, the U.S. 
State Department approved Cobra Gold to resume the following year with full 
participation.136 In 1993, Thailand formally made its airfields and port facilities available 
to the U.S. military through a logistics agreement.137 In 1994, other countries such as 
Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Australia accepted Thailand’s invitation to attend 
Cobra Gold as observers. By the end of the 1990s, Cobra Gold opened participation to 
other states.  
In the following decade, the bilateral exercise grew to include a wider mission 
scope. In 2000, Singapore became the third nation to participate in Cobra Gold, and in 
2004, the Philippines and Mongolia joined as participants. Following the 2004 tsunami, 
Cobra Gold’s mission shifted to include a multinational interagency disaster relief 
workshop and a combined staff exercise with emphasis on humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief (HADR) operations. Cobra Gold 2005 focused on HADR and expanded to 
include participants from the military and governmental, nongovernmental, and private 
organizations from the United States, Thailand, Singapore, and Japan. Observing states in 
2005 included China, Pakistan, Cambodia, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates. What 
started as a bilateral exercise between the United States and Thailand has grown over the 
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decades to become the largest exercise in the world, with significant diplomatic and 
security implications.138  
In May 2006, before the coup, military exercises between the United States and 
Thailand remained similar in nature to the preceding five years in that observing and 
participating states continued to rise steadily. There was no decrease in Cobra Gold 
activity following Thailand’s war on drugs between 2003 and 2005 that saw 
approximately 2,800 individuals extrajudicially killed.139 In addition to Cobra Gold, 
U.S.-Thailand joint military exercises totaled 40 per year.140 Cobra Gold 2006, which 
took place in May, included over 7,800 U.S. military personnel and 4,200 Royal Thai 
armed forces. Additionally, Singapore, Japan, and Indonesia participated in the 
multinational exercise.141 The exercise also provided opportunities for enhancing security 
relations through exposure of participants and observers.  
The democratic setback in Thailand in 2006 was not enough to disrupt strong 
military cooperation with the United States. Bilateral and multinational exercises such as 
Cobra Gold continued with little variance. The United States and Thailand continued 
joint military exercises at a pace of 40 per year, highlighted by the multinational Cobra 
Gold in May 2007. Although U.S. troop participation was reduced, this scale-down was 
due to operational commitments in support of both Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
Operation Enduring Freedom.142 The United States and Thailand continued to work 
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together with an expanded mission scope, allowing for a seamless transition to real-world 
crises in the region.  
The United States was hesitant to cut off Cobra Gold and relations with Thailand 
after the coup, as this type of training proved to be too important. Cobra Gold’s HADR 
training with multinational members enhanced familiarity with the United States, 
Thailand, and regional partners, helping to improve cooperation and understanding.  
In 2008, Cyclone Nargis struck Burma during the Cobra Gold exercise.143 Analysts 
suggest that Nargis compared to Hurricane Katrina but was many times more deadly  
due to Burma’s poor infrastructure, with estimates of up to 84,500 deceased and  
53,800 missing.144 The preparations for the HADR portion of the Cobra Gold mission 
fortuitously staged humanitarian assistance nearby to support Burma. Further, Thailand’s 
Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej convinced Burma’s junta to open its doors to 
international organizations and militaries to provide much-needed assistance, something 
Burma was initially reluctant to do.  
Alexander A. Arvizu, deputy chief of mission for the U.S. Embassy in Thailand 
from 2004 to 2007, asserts that “Cobra Gold has been the most visible symbol of United 
States and Thai military cooperation.”145 Since its inception in 1982, Cobra Gold has 
continued uninterrupted despite Thailand’s democratic setbacks and threats by the United 
States to cancel the exercise. Cobra Gold’s resilience strongly suggests that bilateral and 
multilateral military security cooperation has been too important for both countries and 
for other participating states and observers.  
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2. International Military Education and Training Program  
The IMET program is a relatively low-cost, high-yielding program that invests in 
long-term human capital. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
(DSCA), the U.S. secretary of state determines which countries are eligible to participate, 
while the secretary of defense executes the IMET program.146 Since its inception in 1976, 
IMET has trained future foreign leaders who immersed themselves in American culture 
and were invited to bring their immediate family members with them to the United 
States. During the program, IMET students establish rapport with U.S. military and other 
international officers both in and out of the classroom. These future leaders build 
relationships and mutual trust while developing their professional military education. 
Guest countries receive IMET funding appropriated annually by the U.S. Congress.  
Thailand is a leading nation to benefit from IMET. The United States established 
the IMET program with Thailand in 1952, and the first Thai students began training in 
the same year.147 Prior to the 2006 coup, Thailand was the largest recipient of IMET 
funding in the world, averaging approximately $2.5 million per year.148 Thai IMET 
alumni return to Thailand and use U.S. doctrine and training manuals to professionalize 
their military. These officers are sought after by senior military leaders to act as advisors 
on matters regarding U.S.-Thailand security cooperation.  
Since the program’s inception, tens of thousands of Thai military officers have 
been trained. Most officers serve a full 30-year career and advance to top leadership 
positions in Thailand. According to a RAND case study, approximately 5 percent of the 
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total Royal Thai armed forces received training in the United States under IMET.149 
Although 5 percent may appear small, it is impressive because IMET alumni return to 
assume approximately half the key positions, such as those focused on basic training, 
professional military education, policy development, and command. RAND concludes 
that the majority of IMET-trained Royal Thai officers elevate to top leadership positions 
within Thailand’s military.150  
Thailand’s 2006 coup forced the U.S. government to suspend IMET funding, but 
the United States kept the program available to Thailand through other means. IMET 
funding falls under the military assistance that was suspended following the coup; 
however, viewing it only through a monetary lens is problematic. While the relationship 
between the United States and Thailand did change following the coup because IMET 
funding was suspended, the United States kept its doors open to Thailand for self-funding 
its officers’ participation and by finding other U.S. appropriations. 
When the U.S. State Department announced the suspension of IMET funding in 
accordance with Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, the United 
States continued to allow Thailand to send students.151 Royal Thai Military officers who 
were already approved with presuspension funding were allowed to continue their 
training; however, Thailand had to pay for new students to attend IMET. Institutions such 
as the Naval Postgraduate School continued to admit Thai students who met the 
minimum requirements for training. The United States was legally mandated by Congress 
to suspend IMET funding but temporarily used other U.S. and Thai funds to continue to 
professionalize the Royal Thai Military.  
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3. Foreign Military Sales 
Access to FMS has allowed Thailand to modernize its military with the world’s 
best weapons, services, and training. In 2003, the United States elevated Thailand’s status 
to a major non-NATO ally, granting it even greater access to U.S. military assistance, 
such as U.S. foreign aid and financing for weapons purchase. According to DSCA, the 
FMS program is a U.S. foreign policy security assistance tool that is authorized by the 
Arms Export Control Act (AECA).152 Under this act, the U.S. government is authorized 
to grant, sell, or finance defense equipment and services to foreign countries when the 
president finds that doing so will enhance security interests and promote stability.153 
Further, the United States offers foreign military financing (FMF) that allows eligible 
states grants or low-cost financing to purchase FMS. The secretary of state determines 
which countries are granted access, and the secretary of defense executes the program. 
The official agreement allows the foreign country to use its own funds to purchase FMS 
or to obtain U.S. military grants or aid at a low interest rate guaranteed through FMF.154 
Thailand has had access to both FMS and FMF, allowing it to modernize the Royal Thai 
Military with compatible U.S. equipment.  
The United States offers another option to foreign governments trying to 
professionalize and modernize their militaries on a budget. Under FMS, defense trade and 
arms transfer can also transpire through the excess defense articles (EDA) program. The 
program allows foreign governments to obtain EDA as a grant or at a reduced cost based 
on the condition of the equipment. Equipment conditions range from new to used but 
must be in working condition. Under the EDA program, for instance, Thailand has 
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received naval ships and aircraft with which to modernize its military.155 Countries on a 
budget consider the EDA program an important opportunity. The DSCA coordinates with 
the DOD and facilitates the approval of requests to recipient states.156 Additionally, 
according to Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, EDA also may be sold 
as part of the FMS program under the AECA. Thailand’s security-cooperation status with 
the United States qualifies it for all FMS, FMF, and EDA programs.  
Regarding military sales, U.S. leaders responded in token fashion to Thailand’s 
2006 coup by expressing official displeasure while still trying to maintain support. On 28 
September 2006, the State Department announced the suspension of military assistance 
under Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 109–102).157 
According to the State Department, the United States suspended a total of $29 million in 
security aid. This included the suspension of grants and FMF, which prevented Thailand 
from using U.S. financing. However, and quite importantly, these actions did not prevent 
Thailand from purchasing weapons and equipment from the United States through FMS 
or the EDA program. During the FMF suspension, Thailand continued to purchase FMS 
and EDA with Thai money.  
Thailand was never without options to secure weapons either from the United 
States or from China, which was willing to fill the void imposed by the State Department. 
Thailand’s first option was to continue to purchase weapons from the United States, but it 
could also obtain granted and purchased defense equipment from China. The doors had 
been opened earlier. Sino-Thai military relations can be traced back to the 1980s when 
China strengthened Thailand’s military capabilities by granting artillery, antiaircraft, 
antitank, and tanks against the growing threat from Vietnam during its occupation of 
Cambodia.158 Unlike the United States, China refused to condemn Thailand’s 2006 coup, 
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believing it to be an internal affair. China not only continued to sell weapons and 
equipment to Thailand but also included a $49 million security package.159 Before and 
after the coup, Thailand could purchase weapons from both the United States and China, 
and the only change was U.S. security funding and financing.  
After elections in late 2007, about 14 months after the coup, the Thai government 
returned to elected civilian control. On 6 February 2008, U.S. deputy secretary of state 
John Negroponte assured Congress that Thailand had restored democracy, and the United 
States lifted legal restrictions on security aid.160 Security cooperation funding resumed 
for IMET, FMF, and the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI). However, 
the long-term ramifications of the FMF suspension are still developing as Thailand 
continues to purchase weapons and equipment from other countries at rates higher than it 
did before FMF was temporarily suspended.161  
4. International Law Enforcement Academy Bangkok (Law 
Enforcement Cooperation) 
The ILEA began as a means to protect U.S. national interests abroad and support 
emerging democracies.162 The first ILEA was established in Budapest in 1995. In 1996, 
the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok recommended establishing an ILEA to enhance regional 
security cooperation throughout Asia.163 Two years later, the United States and Thailand 
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signed a bilateral agreement and partnered to provide training to combat drug trafficking 
and related transnational crimes that plague the region.164 The ILEA in Bangkok 
represents one of four regional academies and the only one in Asia that covers Southeast 
Asia and China.  
The program’s objectives are to combat international drug trafficking, 
international crimes, and terrorism through international cooperation.165 According to the 
State Department, “The ILEA’s mission is to buttress democratic governance through the 
rule of law; enhance the functioning of free markets through improved legislation and 
law enforcement; and increase social, political, and economic stability by combating 
narcotics trafficking and crime.”166 The academy provides training and assistance 
designed by U.S. government agencies in partnership with host nation agencies that 
enhance security cooperation and support participating nations in adopting international 
law enforcement standards.  
U.S. agency and Thai agency officials jointly designed the structure and 
organization of the ILEA in Bangkok. Thailand and the U.S. Embassy provide the 
instructors and logistical support. For example, representatives from U.S. agencies 
include those drawn from the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); 
Thailand provides equivalent representatives from agencies such as the Royal Thai Police 
and the Thai Office of the Narcotics Control Board.167 The DEA is the lead agency 
responsible for providing structure and program support for the academy in Bangkok. 
Thailand provides key personnel to positions such as the executive director, deputy 
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executive director, and the chiefs of each subsection. The U.S. Department of State 
finances the majority of training through the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement (INL), and other U.S. government agencies or foreign governments can 
contribute to fund specialized courses.168  
ILEA courses are designed to meet specific needs of participating countries, but 
the U.S. government evaluates those needs as they relate to U.S. interests. States wishing 
to participate must seek nomination through the U.S. Embassy in their country and must 
meet U.S. requirements. For instance, foreign intelligence officers and states that are 
known for human rights violations are excluded from participation. While other countries 
such as Japan, Holland, Australia, and Hong Kong also contribute to the multinational 
staff of trainers, the United States maintains greater influence on the ILEA in Bangkok 
because it is the lead agent and gatekeeper for international participation.  
ILEA Bangkok remained resilient after the 2006 coup. Law enforcement 
cooperation affects a range of security-related issues, and both the United States and 
Thailand categorized transnational crimes as threats to national security, especially from 
international terrorism but also from unexpected shifts in regional balances of power.169 
These threats include trafficking in narcotics and arms, human trafficking, money 
laundering, and violations of international and domestic law enforcement. The academy 
in Bangkok provides law enforcement training to Southeast Asian nations to combat 
transnational crimes and promotes international law enforcement security cooperation. 
Although the United States suspended some forms of security aid to Thailand after the 
2006 coup, programs that were considered vital to U.S. interests, such as ILEA, 
continued.  
C. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
Diplomatic relations between the United States and Thailand have been sustained 
for almost two centuries. In the early 19th century, Asia was a desirable trading 
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destination for the West. In the 1820s, President Andrew Jackson sent the first American 
envoy to Siam led by Edmund Roberts, who was granted access by King Nang Klao, 
Rama III. In 1833, the two countries agreed to the first diplomatic act with the Treaty of 
Amity and Commerce. While neighboring countries were being colonized, King 
Mongkut, Rama IV, modernized the Kingdom’s bureaucracy and believed that opening 
up Siam’s foreign policy to the West was necessary to ensure Siam’s survival. In the 
1850s, Somdet Chao Phraya Si Suriyawong became the leading minister to King 
Mongkut and was responsible for concluding treaties with England and the United 
States.170 In 1856, the United States appointed the first American consul, Reverend 
Stephen Mattoon, in Siam and signed the Harris Treaty, which was an update to the 
Treaty of Amity.171 These treaties not only strengthened the two countries’ friendship, 
but they also helped Thailand avoid colonization.  
Diplomacy continued to advance the friendship in the second half of the century. 
As a token of good will, King Mongkut sent a sword and photograph and offered 
elephants to President James Buchanan in 1861.172 After recovering from the American 
Civil War, the United States formalized legation in 1882, opening full diplomatic 
relations with the Kingdom and appointed John A. Halderman as the first American 
consul general.173 Siam reciprocated by appointing Prince Prisdang Jumsai, who earned 
his advanced degree in London, as the first minister to the United States, England, and 
ten other European countries. In 1884, President Chester A. Arthur received the first 
official diplomat, Prince Nares Warariddhi, appointed to the United States and the United 
Kingdom. This was the first of many official royal visits by Siam leading up to WWII.  
The challenges of WWII tested and catapulted U.S.-Thailand diplomatic relations 
to a new level. After attacking Pearl Harbor in 1941, Japan invaded Thailand; to avoid 
being colonized, Thailand bandwagoned by joining forces with Japan. When prime 
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minister Field Marshal Phibun signed a defense pact with Japan and declared war against 
the United States, the Thai ambassador Seni Pramoj refused to deliver the declaration. Dr. 
Wichitwong Na Ponphet, a fellow of the Royal Institute, explained how a large group of 
Thai rebels who lived in Thailand, the United States, and Great Britain formed the Free 
Thai Movement and helped the Allies.174 As a result, the United States never declared 
war against Thailand and would later accept Thailand’s Peace Proclamation after the war. 
U.S. leaders recognized that Thailand was under duress when agreeing to Japan’s 
demands. The United States vouched for Thailand and convinced other allied nations to 
refrain from treating the Thais as enemy combatants.175 Thailand was able to preserve its 
sovereignty and did not have to disarm and surrender to the Allies. This development had 
a profound effect on Thailand’s leadership and produced increasing cooperation with the 
United States in the second half of the 20th century.  
U.S.-Thailand diplomatic relations accelerated significantly after WWII. In 1947, 
the United States elevated the legation office in Bangkok to an embassy and appointed 
Ambassador Edwin F. Stanton.176 In the 1950s, both countries signed several agreements 
including the notable Manila Pact, which formalized their alliance. Establishments 
emerged in and around the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, such as the JUSMAG, the 
American Chamber of Commerce, and ILEA. Diplomacy in the second half of the 
century was further marked by increased visits from both countries’ leaders, such as King 
Bhumibol, Rama IX, Queen Sirikit, the crown prince and princesses, prime ministers, 
presidents, first ladies, and the secretaries of state and defense. Such high-level visits 
continued well into the 2000s.  
In the 2000s, American and Thai leaders continued to enhance diplomacy by 
exchanging visits and signing agreements. Leaders of both countries made several joint 
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statements from 2001 to 2005.177 In December 2001, President Bush and Prime Minister 
Thaksin reaffirmed their countries’ alliance and pledged to continue to strengthen 
cooperation. They exchanged visits in 2003 and concluded the year by upgrading 
Thailand’s status to major non-NATO ally. The 2005 joint statement highlighted bilateral 
cooperation in terms of both regional and global interests, with both leaders agreeing on 
the potential for greater cooperation.178 In all three meetings, President Bush and Prime 
Minister Thaksin acknowledged the nations’ history of cooperation against terrorism and 
transnational crimes. They agreed to expand trade and investment ties that would be 
mutually beneficial and high-level visits that would reinforce an already friendly 
relationship.  
U.S.-Thailand relations were only temporarily disrupted by Thailand’s coup. In 
December 2006, only three months after the coup, former president George H. W. Bush 
and Mrs. Barbara Bush visited Thailand and pledged to continue support for relief efforts 
from the devastating tsunami that had occurred one year prior. Immediately following 
Thailand’s return to democracy in 2008, executive visits recommenced from leaders such 
as assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs Ambassador Christopher 
Hill; secretary of defense Robert M. Gates; deputy assistant secretary of state for 
professional and cultural exchanges Alina L. Romanowski; and President Bush.179  
The U.S. government faced the dilemma of trying to maintain its relationship with 
Thailand while still signaling disappointment by announcing sanctions. A Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) report defines sanction as, “any measure or action of a 
diplomatic, economic, or military nature taken by a nation or a group of nations to coerce 
. . . [a state] to comply with expected conduct or behavior.”180 The U.S. State Department 
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applied sanctions by suspending assistance programs under Section 508 of the Foreign 
Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 109–102) and funds for operations appropriated 
under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006.181 As noted 
earlier, this decision translated to suspensions of $29 million allocated to Thailand for 
FMF for defense procurement, IMET for training to professionalize the Thai military, 
GPOI programs, and counterterrorism operations. Most analysts considered this U.S. 
response relatively mild, and this judgment appears valid when one considers the full 
spectrum of responses the U.S. government could have taken.182  
U.S. diplomacy against Cuba, following its coup and later revolution, is the most 
extreme example of reactions the government could have taken against Thailand. After 
Fidel Castro overtook President Fulgencio Batista, hiked tariffs on U.S. imports, and 
established trade with the Soviet Union, President Dwight D. Eisenhower responded by 
cutting off diplomatic relations with Cuba and by imposing a trade embargo in 1960. In 
1962, President John F. Kennedy imposed a full economic embargo on Cuba, restricting 
travel and trade estimated at over $1.1 trillion.183 In 1996, after Cuba shot down two U.S. 
aircraft, President William J. Clinton passed the Helms-Burton Act, intensifying the 
embargo by penalizing foreign companies that did business with Cuba.184 Further, the act 
stipulated specific conditions that had to be met before sanctions could be lifted. The U.S. 
diplomatic response against Cuba represents the longest and most extreme political and 
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economic measures taken to coerce a state to comply with U.S. demands. Granted, Cuba 
was an enemy of the Unites States, whereas Thailand is an ally; but this example serves 
to illustrate what diplomatic actions are possible.  
Burma represents a somewhat closer comparison to Thailand in that it has never 
been an enemy of the United States. In this case, the U.S. government officially refers to 
the country as Burma and not Myanmar because it refuses to recognize the abusive 
military regime that changed the name after disallowing elected politicians to take office 
after the National League for Democracy’s landslide victory at the polls in 1990. The 
rationale has been that using the name given by the junta would imply legitimacy.185 
Unlike U.S.-Thailand relations, U.S.-Burma relations have steadily declined since WWII. 
Burma’s relationship with the United States began to decline due to opposing alliances 
with the Kuomindang (KMT) guerrillas from China, a 1962 coup and the resulting 
military government under the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) that favored 
China, and extreme human rights violations against Burmese citizens.186 Yet, despite all 
this, the United States still accepted Burma, granted it most-favored nation status, 
supported international assistance for development, and sanctioned IMET program 
funding up to 1988.187 In August of that year, a peaceful protest against the military 
government turned bloody when soldiers attempted to put down demonstrations. The 
U.S. Senate and House immediately condemned the killings and supported a rapid return 
to democracy. President Ronald Reagan applied greater pressure by suspending all U.S. 
aid and implementing substantial sanctions.  
The U.S. response to Thailand’s 2006 military coup pales in comparison to 
sanctions against Burma’s military government. From 1990 to 2012, the U.S. government 
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imposed sanctions comprising six laws and five presidential executive orders.188 
Economic sanctions included withholding U.S. contributions to international programs 
for Burma, prohibiting all importation of goods, and banning U.S. investments in Burma. 
Additionally, Burma’s military aid suspensions included the restriction of all weapons 
sales, not just financing. Diplomatic sanctions included suspending preferential treatment, 
restricting travel to and from Burma, banning the visas of certain Burmese nationals, and 
opposing loans to Burma by international financial institutions. In contrast, the U.S. 
government imposed only the minimum legally mandated suspension of military aid 
against Thailand after Thailand’s military leaders unseated the Kingdom’s elected 
government, suggesting that Thailand was shown preferential treatment.  
D. CONCLUSION  
Thailand’s 2006 coup appeared to somewhat delay expanding relations with the 
United States but produced insignificant deviations overall. Economically, bilateral 
economic relations experienced a very slight downturn, but that development was short 
lived. The indefinite suspension of free trade negotiations by both sides—first at 
Thailand’s request earlier in 2006 when it faced internal unrest and then by the United 
States immediately following the coup—was the most significant negative impact, given 
that both countries have continued to sign FTAs with other countries but not each other. 
Thailand secured agreements with Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New 
Zealand between 2007 and 2010.189 During the same period, the United States completed 
FTAs with Oman, Peru, and Jordan.190 Despite lacking a formal FTA, bilateral trade 
remained strong and continued to rise gradually. Although FDI dipped in 2006, the 
underlying cause remains unclear. Overall, economic relations recovered quickly and, 
with the exception of FTAs, continued on a positive trend until the global financial crisis 
of 2008.  
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Despite these temporary and relatively minor economic setbacks, security 
cooperation remained strong. The U.S. Congress tried to pressure the Thai government 
through military aid sanctions. U.S. funding for Thai IMET students was immediately 
suspended along with FMF for appropriation of weapons and equipment; however, 
Thailand was allowed to continue participating in both IMET and FMS programs by 
using Thai government funds. Suspension of military aid sounds severe, but what really 
happened was Thailand had to pay its own way for the two programs for a short period. 
Cobra Gold continued uninterrupted, and the government’s rhetoric of reducing U.S. 
military participants was the result of prioritizing limited troop strength toward active 
conflict zones. Furthermore, security cooperation continued in other areas of high 
importance to the global war on terrorism, such as transnational crime. Full support and 
financing remained intact for ILEA. Overall, security cooperation remained firm, and 
slight changes were insignificant to the partnership.  
Diplomatically, the United States continued to cooperate and pledge support for 
Thailand. The U.S. response to the 2006 coup appeared calculated and relatively mild 
when considering the available tools of diplomacy: economic blockades, reduced aid, 
termination of agreements, the recall of ambassadors, and strong condemnation of actions 
unilaterally or the seeking of UN Security Council action. Instead, the State Department 
imposed the legally mandated suspension of military aid and elected to refrain from 
disengagement and harsh rhetoric. The absence of action, such as restricting travel, 
recalling the U.S. ambassador and citizens, or terminating Thailand’s non-NATO status, 
indicates U.S. leaders respected and desired to continue cultivating the relationship. 
Further, instead of condemning the coup or making a formal statement from the United 
States, former president George H. W. Bush went to Thailand to pledge support for 
tsunami recovery efforts just months after the coup. His visit suggests two things: first 
that the United States was not afraid of the interim military government, and second that 
the United States remains committed to Thailand.  
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III. 2014 COUP 
Led by a new administration in 2009, the United States shifted focus to Asia and 
continued to rely on allies, such as Thailand, to help advance its national interests in the 
Asia-Pacific region. In 2010, President Obama formalized the rebalance to Asia in his 
national security strategy.191 According to the strategy, U.S. allies in Asia are paramount 
to the security and prosperity of the region. The United States and Thailand recommitted 
their efforts to economic, military, and diplomatic cooperation in a joint press statement 
between President Obama and Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra.192 Alliance reforms 
with Thailand, such as the 2012 Joint Vision Statement, shifted away from combating 
communism and focused on regional security through bilateral and multilateral 
interoperability and relationship building. The alliance appeared on a positive course but 
was interrupted by Thailand’s 2014 coup. Currently, Thailand claims to be navigating 
back to democracy, and the U.S. response is still developing; however, current trends 
suggest the relationship is on a slight detour but still navigating to the same destination.  
A. ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
The U.S.-Thailand economic relationship maintains course despite setbacks, most 
of which are not the result of U.S. sanctions pressuring Thailand to return to democracy. 
With the second largest economy in Southeast Asia, Thailand is a well-developed, upper-
middle-income market, making it attractive for trade and investment. Thailand continues 
to maintain long-held policies supporting an open market with emphasis on exports and 
foreign investment. Although a U.S.-Thailand FTA remains suspended, the United States 
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continues to be one of Thailand’s top trading and investing partners.193 The Kingdom’s 
steady economic growth, ease of doing business, and regional competitiveness have 
maintained investor confidence.194 This section describes the significance of the FTAs, 
bilateral trade, and FDIs, showing that U.S.-Thailand economic relations have not been 
significantly affected by the 2014 coup.  
1. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
The bilateral FTA never materialized and has remained suspended at Thailand’s 
request since shortly before the 2006 coup. Despite this, both countries have continued to 
diversify trade with one another and other trading partners and to maintain a steady rise 
in overall bilateral trade.195 While neither side has reengaged bilateral negotiations, each 
has aggressively pursued FTAs with other countries. Currently, the United States has 
20 FTAs in effect, and Thailand has 12 with another eight under negotiations.196 For 
Thailand, this strategy supports its export-oriented economy, as depicted in Figure 5, 
which illustrates Thailand’s GDP growth from 2006 to 2014. The data were drawn from 
the Trading Economics’ online database and is the most current information available in 
the first quarter of calendar year 2016. Since recovering from the 2006 coup and 2008 
global financial crisis, Thailand’s GDP has nearly doubled in the past eight years, 
growing from $222 billion in 2006 to $405 billion in 2014. This increase indicates that 
the Kingdom’s economic growth and trade relations have remained resilient despite the 
halted bilateral trade agreement with the United States, one of its most important trade 
partners. Indefinite suspension of the U.S.-Thailand FTA does not appear to have had a 
negative impact on Thailand’s economic growth or trade relations with the United States.  
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Figure 5.  Thailand Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 2006–2014197 
 
The dashed bars represent the 2006 and 2014 coups.  
2. Bilateral Trade  
Bilateral trade relations between the United States and Thailand continued to 
grow at a slow but steady pace. Using data drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau’s online 
database, from 2009 to 2014, U.S.-Thailand bilateral trade grew from $26 billion to 
$38.9 billion (see Figure 6). Additionally, Figure 7 demonstrates that the United States 
remained among Thailand’s top three bilateral trading partners, behind China and Japan. 
To show the most reliable figures available, data for Figure 7 were drawn and compared 
across multiple sources, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the U.S. 
Census Bureau, and Thailand’s Ministry of Commerce online database. Although China 
surpassed the United States to become Thailand’s top bilateral trading partner in 2010, 
the United States continued to be Thailand’s number one export destination.198 Trade 
relations appear to be on an increasingly positive course.  
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Figure 6.  U.S.-Thailand Bilateral Trade 2009–2015199 
 
The dashed bar represents the 2014 coup.  
Figure 7.  Thailand’s Bilateral Trade with Top Partners, 2009–2015200 
 
The dashed bar represents the 2014 coup.  
Thailand’s economy relies heavily on its export-oriented market, and the United 
States remains a reliable and steadily growing export destination. Thailand’s 2014 coup 
                                                 
199 Adapted from the U.S. Census Bureau, Trade in Goods with Thailand, 12 December 2015, 
www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5490.html. 
200 Adapted from Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 19 February 2016,  
http://statistics.apec.org/index.php/bilateral_linkage/bld_result/40; the U.S. Census Bureau, Trade in Goods 
with Thailand, 12 December 2015, www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5490.html; and Ministry of 
Commerce, 15 January 2016, www2.ops3.moc.go.th. 
 61
does not seem to have significantly impacted bilateral trade relations. In 2015, the United 
States remained Thailand’s top trade partner in terms of export, purchasing $23.7 billion 
in goods, which equates to 11.2 percent of Thailand’s total exports.201 China was a close 
second at $23.3 billion, totaling 11.1 percent of Thailand’s total exports.202 The majority 
of Thailand’s exports to the United States are in the automobile and computer parts 
industries.203 The United States could buy similar products from other markets but 
continues trade with Thailand.  
3. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)  
Thailand’s well-developed infrastructure makes it a competitive and desirable 
investment destination. Over the past decade, U.S. FDI in Thailand has ranged from a 
low of −$199 million to a high of $3.97 billion, suggesting the wide fluctuations seen in 
Figure 8 may be normal. After posting negative investment of −$44 million in 2009, an 
outcome most likely related to the global financial crisis that started in the United States 
in 2008, U.S. companies resumed positive investment levels in Thailand, posting 
$1.43 billion in 2010. Indeed, U.S. FDI in Thailand posted positive inflows each year 
between 2010 and 2014, hitting their peak of $3.97 billion in 2012. In 2011, FDI 
remained positive, despite ongoing political turmoil and Thailand’s suffering one of its 
worst floods in history, which hit the economically vibrant central Thailand and Bangkok 
regions most heavily.204  
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Figure 8.  U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Thailand between 2006 and 2015205 
 
The dashed bar represents the 2014 coup. 
Thailand, in cooperation with ASEAN, not only recovered from this natural 
disaster but emerged as one of the top FDI recipients in the region. Masataka Fujita, head 
of the Investment Trends and Issues Branch at the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), acknowledged that “accelerated regional integration 
contributes to rising FDI flows in East and Southeast Asia where China, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand are the top five recipients of FDI in the region.”206 
Furthermore, the 2014 UNCTAD report anticipated the level of FDI in Southeast Asia 
would continue to increase from 2015 to 2017.207 Predicting if Thailand’s current 
drought, one of its worst in 20 years, will have a negative impact on FDI from any 
partner is difficult.208  
Overall, FDI remains a significant part of Thailand’s economy, but the political 
turmoil (not the September 2014 coup, per se), has caused some projects to be 
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suspended.209 Nevertheless, investors’ confidence in Thailand has improved, and 
Thailand is currently a favorable investment destination for investors from the United 
States and other countries such as Japan and China. Thailand has continued to improve 
the ease of doing business in the Kingdom, while making a calculated economic strategy 
shift. A month after the coup, the World Bank reported that Thailand ranked among the 
top 30 economies in the world and second among emerging economies in Asia.210 
However, prior to coup, Thailand’s Board of Investment (BOI) shifted policy to target the 
technology sector, encouraging innovation and positioning Thailand as an international 
trading hub. This new policy became effective in 2015 and resulted in an overall FDI 
decline in 2015 of approximately 78 percent.211 As Figure 8 shows, the U.S. FDI in 
Thailand dropped to −$199 million, meaning investors took out more money in 2015 than 
they put in. The BOI made deliberate reforms, shifting away from labor-intensive 
industries and anticipating a downswing as a result. Advanced technology companies 
now received maximum benefits including tax exemption, and companies that previously 
received tax exemptions in other industries were excluded.212 Thailand’s top three FDI 
contributors all saw a drop in 2015: Japan by 81 percent, China by 21 percent, and the 
United States by 142 percent.213 Ultimately, Thailand’s investment incentive reforms 
provide a more compelling explanation for the 2015 decline in FDI than the 2014 coup.  
B. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS  
Since the end of WWII, security cooperation between the United States and 
Thailand continues to be the strongest pillar of the relationship. The U.S. government 
demonstrated its commitment to the region by increased military exercises and law 
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enforcement cooperation. In 2008, military aid was restored to pre-coup levels for IMET 
and FMF. Then, both countries signed a joint vision statement for a Thai-U.S. Defense 
Alliance in 2012, committing security cooperation to achieve peace and prosperity in the 
region.214 Following the 2014 coup, the U.S. government was forced to suspend military 
aid to Thailand. This section emphasizes the importance of security cooperation, shows 
how the U.S. government maintained both Cobra Gold and ILEA and suspended military 
aid for IMET and FMF, and concludes that the administration disapproved of Thailand’s 
coup but responded in a similar manner as it had to the previous coup.  
1. Cobra Gold  
Cobra Gold, the largest multinational exercise in the Pacific, has evolved to 
become a distinguished exercise that fosters cooperation and stability in Southeast  
Asia and throughout the world. This type of collaboration further strengthens current 
relationships and creates new opportunities for friendship. The commanding general of 
USARPAC, Lieutenant General Benjamin Mixon, stated his objectives for Cobra Gold 
2009 were “to teach coalition warfare and provide tactical training.”215 He further 
emphasized the strategic goal was to build relationships. From 2009 to 2014, Cobra Gold 
incorporated new participating states, such as Malaysia in 2011, and observing countries, 
such as Burma, China, and Vietnam, making it the world’s largest combined military 
exercise.216 Thailand invited Burmese Armed Forces officers in 2013 and again in 2014 
to expose the Burmese military to internationally respected military counterparts and 
demonstrate how these militaries inculcate international standards—especially the respect 
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for human rights—into their planning and operational execution.217 The bilateral exercise 
transformed into a setting for multilateral cooperation to cultivate relationships that are 
strategically valuable for both co-hosts. 
Cobra Gold provides a venue to improve coordination not only between U.S. and 
Thailand armed forces but also with participating and observing countries. By 2014, 
participating states included Thailand, the United States, Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and South Korea, with a total of more than 13,000 service members.218 China 
became an Observer Plus, meaning its service members observed and participated in  
the noncombat portions of the exercise.219 Furthermore, official observers included  
those from 11 nations: China, Burma, Vietnam, Laos, South Africa, New Zealand, the 
Netherlands, Ukraine, Russia, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom.220 Gregory Poling of 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies emphasizes that “all of this exposure is 
indispensable to building strategic trust and interoperability in the wider region, 
especially in critical areas like HADR, military medicine, and search and rescue.”221 
During her first Cobra Gold in 2011, U.S. ambassador to Thailand Kristie Kenney 
asserted that Cobra Gold would allow militaries “to forge lasting friendships that will pay 
dividends for years to come… [these relationships] will be a key factor in the future 
success of joint humanitarian and regional security operations in the future.”222 Kenney 
also specifically highlighted that Thailand is our ally, the Thai people are our friends, and 
she hopes that friendship will last a lifetime. Cobra Gold is not only a premier 
multilateral military exercise, it has also become a tool for U.S. regional diplomacy. 
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Following the May 2014 coup, the U.S. government once again immediately 
suspended military assistance funds for Thailand but subsequently took a more 
diplomatic approach to bilateral security engagements. Initially, Cooperation Afloat 
Readiness and Training (CARAT) 2014, an annual bilateral U.S. Navy exercise that was 
in progress, was canceled. Hanuman Guardian, an annual bilateral Army exercise 
scheduled for June, was also canceled, and invitations were revoked for Thai observers to 
attend the biannual multilateral maritime Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise.223 
However, after this particular coup, the U.S. government established a case-by-case 
interagency vetting process to determine approval for all security engagements. For 
example, sales of select weapons and equipment that could be used to oppress the Thai 
people have been suspended. Planning conferences for Cobra Gold 2015 were postponed, 
then canceled, and later approved after the administration decided to continue with the 
exercise. Additionally, the exercise’s scope and mission were significantly refocused on 
HADR and scaled down in terms of U.S. troop participation.  
The United States publically exhibited its displeasure with Thailand’s coup but 
sent a stronger message by continuing Cobra Gold. U.S. officials reduced U.S. military 
participation by sending 3,600 U.S. troops in 2015 and 2016 instead of the previous 4,300 
in 2014; however, the number of participant and observer nations increased from 18 in 
2014 to 24 and 27 in 2015 and 2016, respectively.224 In 2015, chargé d’affaires W. 
Patrick Murphy conveyed the unwavering U.S. commitment to Asia and specifically 
Thailand, a close friend and ally for 182 years.225 He added that the multinational 
military exercise transcends any bilateral relationship because it strengthens cooperation 
in the region. In 2016, Ambassador Glyn Davies reaffirmed that Cobra Gold 
“demonstrate[s] America’s unshakable, long-standing commitment to this [Southeast 
Asian] region. That commitment is strong and enduring, including here in Thailand, 
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where it transcends any temporary challenges that arise in our partnership.”226 Davies 
inferred that the relationship could reach its full potential once Thailand returns to a 
sustainable democratic system and advocated that the relationship already has a  
solid foundation to build upon. A reduced U.S. presence was the administration’s way  
of showing disapproval to the coup, but a stronger response would have been  
completely canceling or moving the venue to a different country. Continuing Cobra Gold 
uninterrupted suggests that the United States values the preservation of defense 
cooperation with its ally Thailand, as well as with the region, more than it disapproves of 
the coup.  
2. International Military Education and Training Program  
After the United States certified that Thailand had returned to democracy in 2008, 
the U.S. Congress resumed funding for the IMET program. IMET funding is appropriated 
each year for the following fiscal year (FY). A given FY begins on 1 October and ends on 
30 September, and the year is designated by the calendar year in which it ends. For 
example, FY2008 begins on 1 October 2007 and ends on 30 September 2008.  
The United States appeared to cultivate security cooperation through IMET 
funding. Between FY2008 and FY2014, the U.S. Congress allocated Thailand an average 
of approximately $1.4 million per year for IMET. Furthermore, the U.S. Department of 
State requested an increase of $2.1 million in 2015. In fact, Thailand was one of the top 
priority recipients of IMET funding according to the FY2015 Congressional Budget 
Justification presented by the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related 
Programs in March 2014.227 A $12.5 million budget was requested specifically for East 
Asia and the Pacific, and the key recipients were Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Vietnam.  
Figure 9 illustrates IMET funding for Thailand from FY2008 through FY2015. 
This data were drawn from the U.S. Department of State IMET account summary online 
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database. The amounts shown from FY2008 through FY2013 are actual expenditures. 
The FY2014 amount of $1.3 million was approved, but the actual amount expended was 
$713 thousand before funds were suspended following the 2014 coup. The red line in 
Figure 9 represents the requested amount. Further, the amount shown for FY2015 was the 
requested budget for Thailand submitted to Congress prior to the coup. It appears that 
bilateral security cooperation with IMET was trending up.  
Figure 9.  International Military Education and Training Funding  
for Thailand FY2008 through FY2015228  
 
The dashed vertical line represents Thailand’s 2014 coup.  
However, this IMET funding for Thailand was immediately suspended following 
the 2014 coup and has not yet been reinstated. In FY2014, Thailand’s budget was 
earmarked for approximately $1.3 million, but the actual expenditure was approximately 
$713 thousand. Thai officers who were already executing IMET training were allowed to 
continue, but Thailand now had to pay to send future students to train in the IMET 
program. For example, the Naval Postgraduate School had two Thai students who 
graduated in 2015: one grandfathered under IMET funding and the other sponsored by 
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Thai government funds.229 The funding originally requested in FY2015 for Thailand was 
recuperated by the State Department’s Budget Amendment Justification and then applied 
to other programs focused on emerging threats, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL).230 Furthermore, the State Department did not request IMET funding for 
Thailand for either FY2016 or FY2017. In regard to IMET, the U.S. response to 
Thailand’s 2014 coup appears to follow the same pattern as that of the 2006 coup.  
3. Foreign Military Sales 
Thailand’s access to FMS continued uninterrupted despite both coups, but FMF 
was negatively affected by the coup. Following the 2006 coup, FMF resumed in 2008, 
and between FY2008 and FY2014, Thailand was allocated an average of approximately 
$1.3 million per year to upgrade its military equipment. In the FY2015 Congressional 
Budget Justification, the Department of State declared the $67.4 million earmarked for 
East Asia and the Pacific was necessary to “further U.S. interest around the world by 
helping ensure that coalition partners and friendly foreign governments are capable of 
working toward common security goals and sharing burdens in joint missions.”231 The 
department further linked this financial assistance to supporting the administration’s 
rebalance toward Asia and demonstrating its commitment to the region. Thailand 
remained a critical player in the rebalancing effort, and the resumption of FMF allowed it 
to purchase weapons using U.S. guaranteed loans.  
Figure 10 illustrates FMF funding for Thailand from FY2008 through FY2015. 
This data were drawn from the U.S. Department of State’s FMF account summary online 
database. The amounts shown from FY2008 through FY2013 are actual expenditures 
while the FY2014 amount of $1.0 million was an estimate. Notably, the FY2015 amount 
of $0.9 million was requested prior to the 2014 coup. According to CRS reports, Thailand 
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received approximately $1.4 million per year from FY2002 to FY2006, which ended in 
September, the same month as the 2006 coup.232 Figure 10 shows that from the first full 
fiscal year of restored military assistance in FY2009 to the estimated FY2014 budget, the 
U.S. Congress allocated approximately $1.4 million per fiscal year. FMF appears to have 
resumed to previous averages for Thailand.233 Both FY2014 and FY2015 figures were 
submitted to Congress prior to Thailand’s coup in May 2014, so the decreased funding 
request was not directly influenced by the coup. Accordingly, the 2015 CRS report notes 
that the actual FY2014 expenditure amount and FY2015 funds, as indicated by the red 
line, have been retracted and reallocated.234 The blue line in Figure 10 represents the 
actual figure following the military aid suspensions. Thailand’s access to U.S.-backed 
finance-friendly rates were halted, and the Thai government would have to seek other 
purchasing alternatives. 
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Figure 10.  Foreign Military Financing for Thailand from FY2008 to FY2015235 
 
The dashed vertical line represents Thailand’s 2014 coup.  
While FMF was suspended following the coup, FMS and EDA remained 
available for Thailand to purchase with its own funds; however, the U.S. Embassy 
established an interagency vetting process to scrutinize such sales. This process allows 
for methodical oversight surrounding the interpretation of U.S. policy. For example, 
although Thailand continued to have access to EDA, the Royal Thai Army’s request for 
excess high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) was canceled 
following the coup. Later, through its newly established interagency process, the U.S. 
Embassy decided to suspend sales of small arms and particular types of equipment that 
could be used to oppress the general public. Although it seems consistent with the letter 
of the law, this determination appears ambiguous since any weapon or piece of 
equipment could be used for malicious purposes. Nevertheless, the process gave U.S. 
officials flexibility to allow or limit the sale of equipment to the Thai government. In 
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response, Thailand has been diversifying by keeping its security purchasing options open 
to other major powers such as China and Russia.236  
4. International Law Enforcement Academy Bangkok (Law 
Enforcement Cooperation) 
Bilateral law enforcement cooperation continued unaffected by both the 2006 and 
2014 coups. Between FY2007 and FY2014, Thailand received an average of $1.6 million 
per fiscal year, and currently it continues to receive allocated international narcotics and 
law enforcement funds.237 The U.S. and Thai governments both remain committed to 
enhancing regional cooperation against transnational crimes by strengthening ties with 
participating countries in Southeast Asia. For example, in 2008, bilateral law enforcement 
efforts resulted in the arrest of an international arms dealer, Victor Bout.238 Moreover, 
the U.S. Embassy’s FY2013 Mission Strategic and Resource Plan detailed the importance 
of improving Thailand’s law enforcement into an effective and trustworthy criminal 
justice system that is consistent with international standards and respectful of human 
rights.239 Transnational crime in the region remains a significant threat to national and 
global security, and ILEA Bangkok serves as a uniform conduit for international security 
cooperation against that threat.  
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The global problem of transnational crime offset the Obama administration’s 
disapproval of the 2014 coup. Southeast Asia’s economy has grown rapidly in the world 
market, but unfortunately, so has cross-border crime. Such crimes are no longer 
compartmentalized in one country and require effective international security 
cooperation. For example, analysts argue that the terrorist bombing at Bangkok’s Erawan 
shrine in 2015 was targeted against Chinese in Thailand as an act of revenge for 
Thailand’s deportation of Uyghur Muslim Chinese back to China.240 Grievances from the 
ethnic minority group in China turned into violence within Thailand’s borders. According 
to a report from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Organized groups 
proliferate and perpetrate crimes faster than trade planners and public security agencies 
develop the skills and relationships to fight them.”241 The report further recommends the 
need for international cooperation, including training on transnational challenges and on 
existing means to counter transnational crime. Transnational crime remains a national 
security threat for the United States and Thailand and for neighbors in Southeast Asia, 
and ILEA Bangkok provides training and networking that promotes regional consensus.  
In sum, the United States and Thailand maintain a close and cooperative law 
enforcement relationship. The U.S. government continues to fund ILEA Bangkok and 
encourages Thai law enforcement counterparts to closely observe the rule of law. 
Additionally, both countries share extradition and mutual legal assistance treaty 
agreements. According to the U.S. Department of State Bureau for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Thailand is considered one of the “most 
effective and cooperative partners of the United States in Southeast Asia, with U.S. 
assistance facilitating and enhancing that cooperation.”242 With U.S. assistance for 
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equipment and training, Thailand has increased its border law enforcement cooperation 
against trafficking. ILEA Bangkok provides a means to strengthen bilateral and 
multilateral partnerships against narcotics, trafficking, terrorism, and other transnational 
crimes. The U.S. government continues to fund this program, signaling that the 
transnational threat requires a strong bilateral law enforcement relationship that is more 
important than the U.S. government’s disapproval of Thailand’s 2014 coup. 
C. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
The diplomatic relationship between the United States and Thailand resumed 
following the disruption of the 2006 coup. From 2008 to 2014, the United States made a 
pivot to the Asia-Pacific region, and both states seemed determined to show their 
commitment to the bilateral relationship. More specifically, the United States took 
deliberate action, generating a rebalance strategy that emphasized key allies in the region. 
President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama visited Bangkok in 2008 and 
2012, respectively. Further, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made three 
official visits, and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Thai Minister of Defense 
Sukumpol Suwannathat signed a joint vision statement for a U.S.-Thai defense 
alliance.243 Several members of Congress and other government officials met with their 
Thai counterparts to discuss the importance of the alliance and cooperation 
opportunities.244 In 2013, U.S. secretary of state John Kerry and Thai deputy prime 
minister/foreign minister Surapong Tovichakchaikul negotiated increased U.S.-Thai 
cooperation in Asia’s multilateral institutions. While Thailand was struggling to maintain 
political stability, the United States was relying on Thailand and four other allies in the 
Asia-Pacific region as the foundation of security and prosperity.245 By 2014, U.S.-
Thailand diplomatic relations appeared to have recovered from the 2006 coup and were 
continuing to improve.  
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Stability in Thailand is strategically important to the United States. During 
Thailand’s political turmoil, which turned to violence in the streets and disrupted the Thai 
economy, U.S. officials urged Thailand to find a peaceful and democratic resolution.246 
Secretary Clinton urged for peaceful dialogue and stressed the following to Thai officials: 
“While you continue on the path to resolve your political differences, we remain 
confident in the strong, enduring bonds between the United States and Thailand.”247 
After the military coup, Secretary Kerry immediately expressed disappointment and 
urged for a quick return to democracy.248 Then in 2015, assistant secretary of state for 
East Asian and Pacific affairs Daniel Russel clarified that “We’re not attempting to 
dictate the political path that Thailand should follow to get back to democracy or take 
sides in Thai politics. But an inclusive process promotes political reconciliation, which in 
turn is key to long-term stability. That’s where our interests lie.”249 The United States 
benefits more from a domestically stable ally that can focus and partner toward regional 
affairs. Principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs Scot 
Marciel later visited with senior Thai officials to express commitment to ongoing U.S.-
Thai cooperation but also political reform and democratic development in Thailand.250  
However, the absence of a U.S. ambassador in late 2014 sent a negative message 
to Thailand, but vacant ambassador positions at U.S. embassies were common at this time 
and appointments were heavily scrutinized throughout the Obama administration.251 
Career ambassadors typically serve three years at a foreign post, and Ambassador Kristie 
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Kenney extended for a fourth year in 2014. When she transferred authority of the U.S. 
mission to the next senior U.S. official W. Patrick Murphy, chargé d’affaires ad interim, 
the U.S. Embassy was without an ambassador for almost a year. However, Thailand was 
not alone. In 2014, Secretary Kerry acknowledged that more than 25 percent of the 169 
nations with a U.S. embassy were without an ambassador.252 Glyn Davies was nominated 
in April 2015, confirmed by the Senate to be the U.S. ambassador to Thailand in June, 
and arrived in Thailand that September.253 Ambassador Davies is a seasoned envoy with 
35 years of diplomatic experience and a specialist in Asian affairs and international 
politics. When Ambassador Davies finally arrived in Thailand, Shawn Crispin, a 
Southeast Asia columnist at The Diplomat, commented that the new ambassador would 
be key to rekindling U.S.-Thailand relations.254  
At present, Ambassador Davies is attempting to normalize diplomatic relations 
with Thailand. By confirming Davies, the U.S. government signaled that it still valued 
Thailand despite disapproval of the coup. Davies’ first arrival in Thailand was followed 
by a well-received visit to the Grand Palace to pay respect and wish good health to the 
monarchy.255 Furthermore, he received personal calls from privy councilors, royal 
advisors to the king, welcoming his appointment as ambassador. In his 2016 speech at the 
Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand, Ambassador Davies noted that while U.S. law 
restricts the full spectrum of security cooperation opportunities, both countries remain 
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fully engaged in areas such as HADR.256 For example, Cobra Gold 2015 and 2016 both 
shifted mission to focus on HADR cooperation. Further, he acknowledged the struggle 
Thailand faces in its return to democracy and expressed commitment to the relationship. 
Davies’ impressive experience as a career diplomat, his background in the region, and his 
engagement with key Thai leaders indicates that the administration seeks a sincere and 
able representative to improve the relationship.  
The U.S. response to Thailand’s 2014 coup appears similar to its response to the 
2006 coup; however, the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok established an interagency vetting 
process to determine specific application of military sanctions. When the 2014 coup 
happened in Thailand, U.S. law mandated that the U.S. government suspend bilateral 
military assistance, currently totaling $4.7 million.257 Once again, the U.S. Embassy 
issued a standard security message alerting U.S.. citizens of the development in Thailand, 
but it did not restrict travel or evacuate citizens.258 This time, the U.S. Embassy’s 
interagency vetting process evaluates and scrutinizes unclear issues surrounding security 
cooperation with Thailand in accordance with the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act 
restrictions.259 For example, this interagency makes decisions on specific weapons sales, 
high-level exchanges, and military exercises. This new development appears to allow the 
administration greater flexibility to reward or punish Thailand. Overall, changes to 
diplomatic relations appear minimal and suggest the U.S. government has chosen the path 
of mostly nonintervention against the 2014 coup. The executive decision by President 
Obama continuing Cobra Gold but limiting U.S. military participation is perhaps a 
revealing reflection of the path the government has chosen. On one hand the U.S. 
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government sent the message of commitment to Thailand, and on the other hand it 
reiterated disapproval of the coup.  
D. CONCLUSION  
Thailand’s 2014 coup appeared to interrupt U.S.-Thailand relations, but the U.S. 
response was similar to the previous coup in tone and action. Economically, Thailand’s 
growth continues to climb despite stalled FTA negotiations. Bilateral trade grew at a 
steady pace, but U.S. FDI in Thailand significantly declined following the coup. 
However, Thailand’s BOI made deliberate policy changes, which became effective in 
2015, and offers a better explanation to this anticipated decline in overall foreign 
investment. Security cooperation remained strong and, with the exception of a new 
interagency vetting process, appeared almost indistinguishable from the previous coup 
response. Once again, in accordance to the Foreign Assistance Act Section 508, the U.S. 
government suspended military financing and training programs to Thailand but 
maintained funding for law enforcement, counterterrorism, and other assistance 
programs. Both ILEA Bangkok and Cobra Gold continued uninterrupted, with the latter 
altering in mission and U.S. participation. IMET and FMF funds were withdrawn, but 
access to U.S. schools, FMS, and EDA remained available to Thailand. Diplomatically, 
the initial U.S. rhetoric appeared stern but considering the spectrum of diplomatic tools 
used seems relatively subdued. According to Ernest Bower of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, “The U.S. is probably compelled by the law to suspend some aid, 
and yes we need to abide by the law, but what’s really important is a strong private 
diplomacy.”260 U.S. leaders have occasionally reminded the Thai government to return to 
democracy but have not taken stronger action considering the diplomatic tools available. 
Overall, the current U.S. response to the 2014 coup appears to be calculated, reserved, 
and retracted noninterference to Thailand’s domestic political reform.  
 
 
                                                 
260 Jessica Schulberg, “The Military Coup in Thailand Is Putting the U.S. in an Awkward Position,” 




To better understand the U.S. responses to Thailand’s 2006 and 2014 coups, this 
chapter examines the events presented in the last two chapters through the lens of the 
balance of power, alliance, and democratization theories. These coups affected the U.S.-
Thai relationship to varying degrees in the areas of the economy, security, and 
diplomacy. Still, the United States remained committed to and engaged with its long-term 
ally. U.S. officials responded to each coup pragmatically while taking into consideration 
Thai leaders’ actions, the regional balance of power, and the significant value of the long-
term partnership, especially in terms of security interests. Although Thailand’s domestic 
political struggles resulted in a deep divide within the Kingdom, the U.S. government 
avoided favoring either side and urged Thai leaders to find a peaceful solution. As a 
result, the administration took the middle road by displaying its displeasure of Thailand’s 
democratic setback, which is consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives to encourage 
more states to become liberal democracies, and by demonstrating its strong commitment 
to Thailand, which is consistent with countering China’s growing influence in the region.  
A. BALANCE OF POWER 
Balance of power theory explains why states interact in certain ways to maintain 
self-preservation in an “anarchic” international system. States are unitary actors that aim 
to survive. Kenneth Waltz maintains that the structure of the international system forces 
great powers to pay careful attention to the balance of power.261 He further argues that 
states behave defensively to maintain rather than upset the balance of power.262 Because 
power is the most basic and effective means of surviving and preventing wars, states will 
often compete for real or perceived power, which is usually a combination of economic, 
security, or diplomatic elements. States can improve internally by increasing economic 
and military strength and externally by creating alliances and pooling resources. In 
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general, states will improve capacity internally or cooperate with other states to check the 
power of a dominant state or bloc of states. John Mearsheimer concludes that great 
powers strive to achieve four main goals that impact other states: “(1) to be the only 
regional hegemon on the globe, (2) to control as large a percentage of the world’s wealth 
as possible, (3) to dominate the balance of land power in their region, and (4) to have 
nuclear superiority.”263 This theory offers a compelling explanation of foreign policies 
that are aimed at self-preservation, such as with Thailand, and power projection and 
maintenance, such as the U.S. objectives to rebalance to Asia as China’s power grows.  
1. Economic 
Balance of power theory suggests that states will respond when economic 
competitors disrupt the status quo. Great powers do not want their rivals to dominate the 
wealth-generating areas or sea lanes of the world, like Southeast Asia. The U.S. 
economic competitors in the region are China and Japan, and all three countries have 
been Thailand’s top bilateral trade partners for the past decade. Although the United 
States has been the dominant economic partner with Thailand, both Japan in 2001 and 
China in 2006 increased bilateral trade to levels that surpassed that of the United States. 
The balance of power theory suggests that the United States would be concerned if its 
competitors increased this margin substantially, which could encourage it to increase 
bilateral trade and other economic ties. A formalized U.S.-Thailand FTA, for instance, 
would have improved trade opportunities and potentially the U.S. share of trade with 
Thailand. 
However, Japan is currently not that far ahead of the United States, and as of 
2012, China is showing signs of leveling off at a similar rate to that of the United States. 
Additionally, U.S. bilateral trade with Thailand has remained at a steady pace, and the 
United States has continued to be competitive among the top three trading partners, 
suggesting that the economic balance of power has not been significantly disrupted. 
Therefore, the United States does not appear to need a formalized FTA with Thailand 
now to preserve its economic position relative to its competitors.  
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Following the suspended U.S.-Thailand FTA, Thailand went on to secure trade 
agreements with China, Japan, and 18 other trade partners. Thailand’s motivation in 
doing so seems to have more to do with maintaining or enhancing its own economic 
position in the global marketplace than in attempting to exclude the United States in the 
wake of pressure to democratize. Thailand’s economic competitors can produce similar 
products at a lower labor cost. Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos also offer investors a more 
politically stable alternative than Thailand.  
Thailand is attempting to avoid the middle-income trap by advancing its 
technology industry with greater emphasis on skilled labor. For instance, Thailand’s BOI 
decided to promote skilled labor in the advanced technology industry.264 In 2015, 
Thailand granted tax advantages to high-technology industries and eliminated existing 
incentives for other industries. During the first year of this transition, investors from the 
United States, China, and Japan responded by withdrawing FDI. Despite having an 
comparative advantage over other countries that invest in Thailand, U.S. investors outside 
the high-technology field suffered greater costs that did not appear to outweigh the 
benefits. As a result of Thailand’s reforms, foreign investors, including the United States, 
decreased their stock in Thailand, and only time will tell if the FDI into Thailand will 
rebound, stabilize, and favor the United States.   
2. Security  
U.S. military presence has dominated the region since the 1950s. Balance of 
power theory predicts that the United States will try to maintain its dominance, especially 
as China expands militarily. Exerting too much democratization pressure on Thailand 
after its most recent coups runs the risk of weakening U.S.-Thailand military engagement 
and providing opportunities to China and Russia, both of which are aggressively pursuing 
enhanced security relations with Thailand. Surachart Bamrungsuk, a military specialist, 
contends that while Thailand remains highly committed to its friendship with the United 
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States, Thai leaders see no problem diversifying Thailand’s options with other great 
powers.265  
For instance, although the United States remains Thailand’s preferred security 
partner, Thailand leaders are negotiating with both China and Russia for submarines, 
helicopters, and tanks. When the U.S. government suspended $29 million in military aid 
to Thailand following the 2006 coup, China stepped in and provided a $49 million 
security package.266 Currently, China assists Thailand with military aid, weapons and 
equipment sales, military student exchanges, and bilateral exercises.267 More recently, 
Thai leaders have engaged with Russia, another large power, to hedge Thailand’s bets 
that the United States would respond in kind.268 Morgenthau asserts that “the balancing 
process can be carried on either by diminishing the weight of the heavier scale or by 
increasing the weight of the lighter one.”269 After each coup, as Thailand diversified its 
security cooperation with other great powers, the options for the United States to protest 
by scaling back military-to-military relations diminished.  
In response to this shift, the U.S. administration sought to maintain the balance of 
power by continuing security cooperation with Thailand, despite the coups in 2006 and 
2014. The administration continued both Cobra Gold and ILEA. Canceling Cobra Gold, 
the multilateral exercise, would signal a wavering U.S. commitment to not only Thailand 
but also to the region. Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, and the Philippines all have 
territorial disputes with China over the South China Sea and rely on the U.S. military to 
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balance China’s rise there now more than ever. ILEA Bangkok offers greater cost 
benefits for the United States, Thailand, and other regional partners that support national 
interests against transnational crimes. For instance, narcotics and human trafficking have 
been known to fund terrorist activities.270 The ability to bring illegal items and people 
across borders also opens the door for terrorist infiltration. The money laundering that 
funds terrorism—smuggling of arms and nuclear and biological materials—threatens 
national and international security. The smuggling of arms and nuclear materials has a 
strong potential to destabilize the balance of power. Concern over these types of threats 
appear to have proven more significant for U.S. leaders than protesting Thailand’s coup.  
A potential security imbalance explains why the United States could not afford to 
exert greater pressure on Thailand following the 2006 and 2014 coups. While other great 
powers pursued Thailand, the U.S. government kept the door open to its long-term ally. It 
is not surprising that U.S. leaders allowed Thailand continued access to both IMET and 
FMS, albeit at the Kingdom’s expense. Furthermore, although some members of 
Congress had suggested the United States should revoke Thailand’s status as a major 
non-NATO ally, the administration sought to maintain its influence on Thailand.271  
3. Diplomatic  
State actors carefully craft diplomacy with balance of power in mind, and the 
United States is no different. The United States has identified China and Russia as 
strategic competitors.272 The theory suggests that the U.S. government would 
compromise if exerting greater pressure against the Thai junta meant the United States 
would lose influence to China or Russia. After the 2006 and 2014 coups, the U.S. 
government condemned the democratic setbacks, while China refused to interfere with 
Thailand’s domestic affairs. Instead, China intensified its economic, security, and 
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political ties with Thailand. Russia behaved similarly.273 In terms of balance of power, 
this was hardly the time for the United States to alienate Thailand.  
Thai actors have been relatively successful in showing the United States that they 
have alternatives and in playing China and Russia off the United States. Publicly, Thai 
leaders claim that they are not favoring relations with U.S. competitors, but that they are 
fostering a more balanced relationship with others, and these developments have not gone 
unnoticed by the United States.274 Pushing Thailand away and toward China or Russia 
would be counterproductive to the U.S. rebalance-to-Asia efforts. Due to fear of stronger 
Sino-Thai relations and warming Russo-Thai relations, the U.S. response to Thailand’s 
coups was limited to legally mandated suspension of military aid and limited press 
releases that gently condemned the military government. From this perspective, it came 
as no surprise that, in February 2016, President Obama invited Thailand’s prime minister 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha to attend the U.S.-ASEAN Summit in California. Balance of 
power theory offers a compelling argument for how both states behaved following the 
2006 and 2014 coups.  
B. ALLIANCE  
States cooperate with one another to enhance their global positions. Noted 
international relations theorist Stephen Walt defines an alliance as a “formal or informal 
relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”275 An 
alliance agreement is essentially a joint declaration assuring support on particular issues 
and under certain conditions, such as an attack by a mutual enemy.276 Throughout WWI 
and until the end of the Cold War, alliances and coalitions were generally formed to 
check a specific threat. Allies assisted one another both during peacetime in the form of 
deterrence and when at war. NATO, an intergovernmental alliance, is one durable 
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example of a political and military alliance.277 United States alliances with Japan, South 
Korea, and Thailand are others.  
In general, alliances are formed as a result of perceived common interest, 
normally surrounding national security. Alliances provide resource-limited states a 
greater chance of survival. George Liska indicates that state actors “join alliances for 
security, stability, and status.”278 Glenn Snyder asserts “formal alliances strengthen 
existing alignments . . . by their solemnity, specificity, legal and normative obligations 
and (in modern times) their public visibility.”279 An alliance can be further strengthened 
in other ways, such as through diplomatic and military support. However, common 
interests may change and alliances can strengthen, weaken, or dissolve when states’ 
interests and behavior are no longer in accord.  
1. Economic  
Alliance theory suggests that the United States and Thailand would come to 
support each other during times of economic distress and that they are likely to value 
FTA and other trade agreements with one another. Globalization has increased economic 
competition and the need for strategic alliances.280 The U.S.-Thai Treaty of Amity is one 
such economic alliance, and FTA is fundamentally a formal economic trade arrangement 
similar to a security alliance. Thailand initially requested suspension of FTA negotiations 
earlier in 2006 so it could focus on its domestic turmoil. After the 2006 coup, the U.S. 
government announced the indefinite suspension of FTA until Thailand’s return to 
democracy.281 However, neither country’s trade officials have reengaged negotiations 
since. This development appears to conflict with alliance theory and does not explain the 
static FTA. However, the United States could have applied more pressure on Thailand 
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after the 2006 and 2014 coups by purchasing similar goods from other countries or 
placing tariffs on Thailand’s imports to the United States. Yet the bilateral trade 
continues to remain strong, cooperative, and mutually supportive, which is typical 
behavior of allies supporting one another. Although the alliance theory does not explain 
the death of the FTA, it does appear to apply to the slow but steady rise in bilateral trade.  
Alliance theory also does not explain why U.S. FDI into Thailand decreased. 
According to this theory, U.S. FDI should have remained durable even under difficult 
conditions, but FDI by all Thailand’s major investing partners decreased in 2015, not just 
that by the United States. A more compelling alternative explanation for the U.S. 
decrease in FDI into Thailand is that Thailand shifted policies to avoid the middle-
income trap and remain competitive in the global market and affected investment by 
corporations from multiple countries.  
The World Bank identified Thailand as one of the highest-performing Asian 
economies in the East Asian Miracle report, which came out in the 1990s.282 At that time, 
Thailand was classified as a newly industrializing economy with a low-to-middle income 
economy. However, by 2011, Thailand was an upper-middle-income economy and had 
improved its relationship with the World Bank Group from borrower-lender to 
knowledge partner.283 Currently, Thailand is transitioning to the next stage of economic 
development, favoring skilled labor in the high-technology industry that fosters 
innovation, a change which should be attractive to the United States in the future.  
While some countries protect their domestic industries through high tariffs and 
other trade barriers, Thailand continues to favor U.S. investors by granting them near-
equal rights to Thai investors.284 U.S. investors still maintain a comparative advantage 
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over other foreign investors, only now these benefits are primarily focused in the high-
technology industry. While only time will tell if this strategic shift will pay off, Thailand 
appears to be on the path taken by other developed East Asian economies, such as South 
Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. In the meantime, the behavior of Thailand shows steadfast 
commitment to its economic alliance with the United States.  
2. Security  
Alliance theory explains why the United States continued security cooperation 
with Thailand, albeit in a restricted arrangement. Historically, the U.S.-Thailand alliance 
has remained durable, despite Thailand’s double-digit coups. Allies depend on one 
another, but in times of need, state leaders may fear abandonment and entrapment. 
Several Southeast Asian states expressed concern about U.S. commitment to the region 
after the end of the Cold War. Fifteen years earlier, the United States abruptly withdrew 
from the Vietnam War arena. Yet, the mutual benefits to each party remains significant 
and have survived these massive shifts. Thailand continues to grant the U.S. military 
access to its ports and airfields, while the U.S. provides Thailand favored status as a key 
partner with the world’s superpower.  
Over time, threats change and alliances can shift, realign, or diminish. Dougherty 
and Pfaltzgraff argue that “once states join an alliance, there is an extensive and 
continuing bargaining process designed to maximize shared interest and to cope with 
security challenges posed by the enemy.”285 The U.S.-Thailand security alliance, 
originally intended to combat the threat of communism on mainland Southeast Asia, has 
now shifted focus toward combatting terrorism and transnational threats. These threats 
pose problems for both countries’ national security interests, and leaders have set aside 
their differences to maintain cooperation, even after the 2006 and 2014 coups.  
Alliance theory suggests that the United States would not abandon its security 
ally, especially one that has remained loyal since WWII. Thailand’s coups have directly 
opposed the U.S. democratic principles, but since Cobra Gold commenced in 1982, the 
exercise has continued uninterrupted annually. Alex Zrvizu, deputy chief of mission for 
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the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, acknowledged that “for a quarter century, Cobra Gold has 
been the most visible symbol of U.S. and Thai military cooperation.”286 Furthermore, 
since its establishment in 1998, ILEA Bangkok also remains funded and cohosted by U.S. 
and Thai officials. The only constriction of security engagement that runs counter to the 
alliance theory is the U.S.-mandated suspension of military aid for programs such as 
IMET and FMS. After the 2006 coup, Thailand returned quickly to a civilian elected 
government; therefore, the U.S. government was able to shed criticism for its continued 
cooperation with its Southeast Asian ally. Two years on, Thailand has yet to return to a 
civilian elected government after its most recent coup, yet the U.S. government has not 
abandoned its security ally. Alliance theory helps explain why the United States opted to 
maintain key activities between the two countries even as minor restrictions were applied.  
3. Diplomatic 
The quid pro quo nature of alliance theory suggests that each state supports each 
other diplomatically whenever possible. This explains to some degree why the Bush and 
the Obama administrations exercised some discretion after Thailand’s 2006 and 2014 
coups. A CRS report considers Thailand’s alliance to be highly valued and of strategic 
importance.287 Following the 2006 coup, the U.S. response was considered relatively 
mute by many analysts.288 After news of the coup broke, U.S. officials expressed hope 
that the people of Thailand would resolve their political differences by peaceful 
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means.289 Significantly, the United States did not offer sanctuary to ousted prime 
minister Thaksin, who was at the UN General Assembly in New York.  
In 2014, the U.S. government response varied from its 2006 response in two 
minor details:  the stern public statement by Secretary of State John Kerry and the 
administration’s Cobra Gold military participation downgrade. However, since that initial 
statement, the U.S. government’s public statements have been muted. Current downsizing 
of the U.S. military and continued U.S. military involvement in the Middle East and 
Afghanistan offer a compelling explanation as to why Cobra Gold has been scaled back 
slightly.290 During the surge in Iraq and later Afghanistan, the priority for assignment of 
troops was targeted at units in the combat rotation. The military downsizing, or 
rightsizing, was a result of the U.S. government’s plan to cut military spending and 
decrease the military personnel surge that was necessary for war rotations.291 Although 
still important, military exercises became secondary to the war efforts. Pavin 
Chachavalpongpun, professor at Kyoto University, claims that the countries’ intimate, 
long-standing, and mutually beneficial military relationship remains steadfast, allowing 
the United States leeway to publicly criticize Thailand’s coups without threatening the 
alliance.292 U.S. officials can safely express displeasure while sending gentle reminders 
that the administration has not forgotten about Thailand’s political situation.  
Additionally, alliance theory suggests that both the United States and Thailand 
would remain loyal to each other and to a large degree have. The U.S. administration 
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applied the minimum amount of pressure required by law and announced continuing 
areas of cooperation on a consistent basis. Then, U.S. officials appointed a career 
diplomat, Glynn Davies, to be the U.S. ambassador to Thailand, a development that 
signals strong commitment, and updated the Thailand-U.S. Defense Alliance, the United 
States’ second security agreement with the Kingdom. At the U.S.-ASEAN Summit in 
California in 2016, President Obama announced a new initiative called U.S.-ASEAN 
Connect. The goal of this initiative is to strengthen U.S. economic engagement with 
ASEAN states.293 The administration chose Bangkok to be one of three regional centers. 
Establishing a center in Thailand suggests that the U.S. government is less concerned 
about the political situation and more concerned about strengthening relations with its 
long-term ally.  
C. DEMOCRATIZATION 
During the Cold War, the democratic United States struggled with the communist 
Soviet Union over geopolitical, ideological, and economic differences. For 45 years, each 
superpower attempted to spread its ideology globally. Now the world’s sole superpower, 
the United States continues to advocate for democracy as a means to promote peace and 
stability around the world.294 This foundational policy is based in part on democratic 
peace theory, which suggests that democratic governments tend to avoid going to war 
with other democracies, respect human rights, and prefer peaceful resolutions.295 In 
practice, the United States encourages democracy in other countries to varying degrees 
and at different times, just as it has in Thailand.  
In its simplest form, democracy means rule by the people; in turn, the government 
exists to protect its citizens and ensure civil and political liberties. Citizens help shape 
policies and law through free speech, freedom of assembly, and elected representatives 
and advocate through civil-society organizations. The most common system globally is a 
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parliamentary democracy in which voters elect politicians to represent their interests in a 
legislative assembly from which the prime minister and cabinet members are selected. 
The assembly members then make decisions based on the majority vote and coalition 
building within their legislatures. Given that democracies encourage diversity of ideas, 
beliefs, and participation, their citizens often have conflicting agendas and, at times, even 
experience setbacks in terms of civil resolution of disputes. 
Democracy promotion has been a key principle of U.S. foreign policy. Generally, 
democratization in its simplest definition is the process of a state’s transition to 
democracy—a system that is less authoritarian, often takes time, and could experience 
setbacks. One of President George W. Bush’s reasons for the Iraq War was to bring 
democracy to the people of Iraq. He stated that the United States was “committed to a 
strategic goal of a free Iraq that is democratic, that can govern itself, defend itself and 
sustain itself.”296 The Bush administration reasoned that promoting democracy abroad 
ultimately benefits that state and U.S. national interest. The 2006 National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism indicated democratization as a long-term solution to combating 
terrorism.297  
In 2013, President Barack Obama reiterated the U.S. commitment in the Middle 
East by expressing continued support for a stable transition to democracy.298 The 2015 
National Security Strategy indicates that “defending democracy and human rights is 
related to every enduring national interest; . . . we know from our own history [that] 
people must lead their own struggles for freedom if those struggles are to succeed.”299 
Democratic institutions, weak in their infancy, can fail to perform their mandate, 
lowering citizens’ confidence in democracy. Some states, such as Thailand, appear stuck 
in a perpetual coup cycle, alternating between authoritarianism and democratization.300 
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According to a CRS report, “While some observers believe that spreading democracy is a 
key foreign policy priority, other argue that democracy promotion is but one of a number 
of U.S. strategic objectives and not necessarily the overriding one.”301 Other factors 
should also be considered and prioritized. The current U.S. National Security Strategy 
asserts that our closest allies will be other democratic states, and the administration 
encourages Thailand to return to democracy. However, democratization takes time to 
develop and inculcate.  
Thailand’s democratization process has been relatively slow and has experienced 
several setbacks. In the 1970s, Thai citizens challenged the military’s involvement in 
politics and, from 1976 to 1978, embarked on nascent democratization. Prime minister 
and former general Prem Tinsulanonda’s nondemocratic regime of the 1980s gradually 
introduced democratic reforms, with elections taking place in 1988 and 1990 before a 
coup on 23 February 1991 briefly ended Thailand’s democratic experiment. Expansion of 
education and robust economic growth in the Kingdom in the 1980s and 1990s 
contributed to a growing middle class that was better able to challenge the 
establishment.302 Black May of 1992, a violent uprising against the military regime, 
appeared to end Thailand’s coup cycle. For almost 15 years, Thailand’s military refrained 
from becoming directly involved in politics, but the military seized control in 2006 and 
2014, claiming to protect the monarchy.  
Amidst domestic public criticism, the current Thai government, led by General 
Prayuth, is attempting to promote its legitimacy through improved economic, security, 
and political relations at home and abroad. Thai scholar Suchit Bunbongkarn observes 
that “any political regime which does not secure legitimacy will find it hard to survive 
since its legitimacy depends on its acceptance by its citizens as expressed through major 
political forces.”303 After the 2006 and 2014 coups, the military regime insisted that its 
actions were necessary to remove Thaksin and his illiberal government to facilitate free 
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and fair elections, rebuild democratic institutions, and contain corruption. 304 The Prayuth 
government claims to be navigating back to democracy, but based on the proposed 
constitution, which Thais will vote on in an August 7, 2016, referendum, Thailand will 
most likely be less of a Western-style democracy and more of a Thai-style democracy.305  
Joshua Kurlantzick, a senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign 
Relations describes Thai-style democracy as a system where multiple institutions 
represent elite interests and can overrule elected representatives; this system is 
characterized by relatively free elections and rule by elected officials, but the Thai 
establishment’s power is preserved.306 According to the U.S. Department of State, “Some 
observers have characterized provisions within the [draft] constitution, as well as laws 
that prohibit campaigning for or against the referendum, as undemocratic and designed to 
institutionalize the role of the military in Thai politics.”307 Prayuth insists that his 
government is acting transparently and in the best interests of the Kingdom, with a stable 
democracy as an eventual end-goal.308 For Thailand, a hasty return to democracy 
followed by a failing democratic institution in Thailand could perpetuate the Kingdom’s 
coup cycle.309  
1. Economic 
In general, democratization theory suggests that a minimal level of economic 
prosperity, economic freedom, and rule of law with protection of property rights is 
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needed for democracy to take hold.310 Historically, liberal democracies have tended to be 
associated most with economic prosperity, with the exception of the current communist 
regime in China, among others. Several elements of democracy appear compatible with 
economic growth. For instance, freedom of expression and competition can promote 
innovation. Freedoms of assembly, association, and the press can encourage business 
collaborations and flexibility. Rule of law, transparency, and accountability help to 
combat corruption.311 These factors, in turn, are valued by investors who bring fresh 
capital that contributes to economic development.312 The overlap between elements 
conducive to democratization and economic prosperity has helped certain developments 
in U.S.-Thailand economic relations, but not others, since 2006.  
Democratization theory predicts that the United States and Thailand would have 
resumed FTA negotiations after Thailand returned to democratically elected rule in 2008, 
yet they did not. Instead, the Obama administration placed greater emphasis on 
multilateral economic and political agreements that included Thailand.313 First, the 
United States appointed an ambassador to ASEAN in 2008. Then, in 2009, the United 
States signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and in 2010, it established a 
permanent mission to ASEAN, thus creating a formal, multinational economic 
partnership with the region.314 In 2016, President Obama showed continuing economic 
commitment to the region when he announced the U.S.-ASEAN Connect initiative.315 
Thus, although a bilateral FTA did not materialize, the United States now has a TIFA 
with ASEAN as a whole, which includes Thailand.316 Even in the absence of a formal 
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bilateral trade agreement, U.S.-Thai two-way trade has continued on a steady upward 
trend for the past two decades.317  
Thailand’s economy and political institutions are both in transition phases, with 
the United States playing a consistent yet moderate role in each. Prayuth’s regime is 
attempting to establish legitimacy by allowing some democratic principles to remain and 
by improving the Kingdom’s economy. Thailand’s desire to sustain and deepen economic 
prosperity was evident in its policy shift toward the high-technology industry to promote 
innovation and its outreach to new partners for increased trade. This policy shift refers to 
changes that Thailand has put into practice since the 2014 coup, specifically the rule of 
law, which fosters stability and encourages FDI. In 2015, Thai and Russian officials 
signed 10 agreements, taking positive steps toward improving bilateral trade.318 In 2016, 
the Prayuth government even set aside nationalist competition with Cambodia over the 
Preah Vihear (Phra Viharn in Thai) temple dispute in favor of economic cooperation 
between the two neighbors.319 Recent estimates by the World Bank and IMF predict 
Thailand’s GDP growth to increase to 3 percent in 2016.320  
2. Security 
Democratization theory and democratic peace theory suggest that advocates for 
democracy, including or perhaps particularly the United States, would have exerted great 
pressure on the Thai military government after the 2006 and 2014 coups to return to 
democracy and to not significantly limit civil political freedoms. A military coup is 
considered a serious step back from democracy, and the United States—if 
democratization was its primary objective—could have sent a stronger message to 
express its disapproval by canceling Cobra Gold and restricting Thailand’s access to 
IMET and FMS funds, but it did not. In the short term, the U.S. government appears to 
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have to set aside its democratization agenda in favor of maintaining stable relations with 
Thailand.  
In the case of security cooperation, the previously discussed balance of power 
theory appears more applicable than the democratization objectives. Joshua Kurlantzick 
claims that the Prayuth government is playing China off the United States.321 The regime 
has outlined a roadmap back to democracy, but implementing that timeline has been 
delayed until 2017. Nevertheless, the U.S. government remains committed to its security 
cooperation with Thailand.  
By scaling back Cobra Gold, the U.S. government could have communicated its 
disapproval of the Thai junta quite publicly and, in turn, reinforced the importance of 
democratic norms and good governance.322 Yet, canceling the exercise would not only 
remove a vital opportunity to practice interoperability and coordination among regional 
states for future humanitarian assistance but also likely decrease U.S. influence with more 
states than just Thailand. Instead, by continuing Cobra Gold, Washington maintains a 
long-standing exercise that is at the heart of its regional engagement.  
After the 2006 and 2014 coups, the United States was legally mandated by 
Congress to suspend IMET funding, but the Pentagon and the State Department 
considered the program too vital to facilitating security cooperation and promoting 
democracy abroad.323 IMET is a means to professionalize foreign militaries and to 
expose international military officers to the United States and its values.324 U.S. values 
and ideals go hand in hand with military training, and IMET is a nonintrusive way to 
promote U.S. ideology. By training future leaders and exposing them to democratic 
values and human rights standards, IMET aligns with U.S. national security interests and 
democratization objectives. According to RAND, U.S. influence on Thailand’s military is 
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amplified by three factors: IMET-trained Thai officers become trainers, Thai military 
training schools adopt U.S. doctrine and training manuals, and IMET alumni become 
future military leaders.325 By suspending IMET funding, the U.S. government weakened 
its democratizing influence, but by allowing Thailand to pay to send its students to the 
United States, it preserved its democratic influence on future Thai leaders.  
3. Diplomatic 
If promoting and supporting democratization was the United States’ top priority 
in Southeast Asia, the U.S. government would likely have more strongly condemned 
Thailand’s two latest coups and exerted greater diplomatic pressure on the subsequent 
military governments. Some members of Congress argued that certain privileges that 
accompany major non-NATO ally status should be reserved for democracies and 
suggested revoking Thailand’s status following the 2006 and 2014 coups.326 Congress 
even introduced the Thailand Democracy Act, which proposed removing Thailand’s 
preferred status.327 Still, neither President Bush nor President Obama took action on the 
proposal. As a result, Thailand continued to have access to U.S. weapons and training. 
Pavin Chachavalpongpun accuses the United States of “being more concerned with 
protecting its own short-term strategic interest [in the region] than with promoting 
democracy.”328  
In regard to its democratization, Thailand's future remains unclear and will 
depend on several developments. First, the current government believes it must finalize a 
new constitution before the next general election can take place. Opponents of the current 
administration question how democratic this constitution will be, given that the first draft 
sought to appoint several active and retired military members to key political 
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positions.329 To Thailand’s credit, the International Crisis Group reports that the 
proposed charter insists on a “democratic system of government with the King as Head of 
State.”330 The interim government admits that its actions were undemocratic, but it also 
claims that they were necessary for stability and promises future progress.331 The next 
constitution will attempt to limit the consolidation of power and establish greater checks 
and balances to protect against a pro-Thaksin party.  
Second, the royal succession, which has been a taboo subject within the Kingdom, 
will play a significant part in the future of Thailand's political landscape. Pavin 
Chachavalpongpun doubts the current military government will relinquish authority until 
a royal succession takes place.332 Whoever succeeds revered King Bhumibol Adulyadej 
will need to establish more than traditional legitimacy if he or she is to play a 
constructive role in reuniting a country that is deeply divided. While U.S. officials 
disapprove of Thailand’s coups and encourage a rapid and complete return to democracy, 
Thai leaders do not want external interference that threatens its sovereignty.  
For the United States, its democratic rhetoric appears less convincing than its 
actions. In 2014, Ambassador Kristie Kenney expressed concerns about the human rights 
implications of the coup and threatened to limit military engagement.333 Since, there have 
been very few official statements criticizing Thailand’s use of lese-majesty laws and 
other legal mechanisms to jail political opponents. In 2016, U.S. ambassador Glyn Davies 
stated, “As deep and broad as our partnership is today, it will grow stronger still when, as 
the prime minister has affirmed, Thailand returns to elected governance. With a 
strengthened, sustainable democratic system, Thailand’s regional leadership role, and our 
alliance, can reach its full potential.”334 With this statement, Ambassador Davies 
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suggests that the United States agrees with the Thai military that halting democracy was 
necessary to rebuild it. Moreover, the United States continues to have high-level 
diplomatic engagement with Thailand—such as at the 2016 U.S.-ASEAN summit in 
California, and military engagement, such as Cobra Gold— further demonstrating that 
the United States is unwilling to exert pressure for the sake of democracy.  
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
The U.S. responses to Thailand’s coups appeared relatively subdued, but a deeper 
examination suggests that U.S. officials were calculated and methodical. American 
leaders considered increasing challenges in Asia by other large powers, signaled their 
commitment to a long-term ally, and upheld national principles that include supporting 
democratization abroad. U.S.-Thailand relations were examined in the realms of 
economy, security, and diplomacy using three theories. This examination showed that 
balance of power theory offers the most logical explanation for muted U.S. actions after 
each coup. Strengthening Sino-Thailand relations challenged U.S. influence in the region, 
so the United States took moderate steps that would not alienate its long-term ally. China 
increased both economic and security cooperation with Thailand while refraining from 
condemning Thailand’s coups. These developments upset the balance of power, 
compelling U.S. officials to take certain actions to maintain the balance in their favor. 
Alliance theory also helps explain the U.S. security commitment and its diplomatic 
relations with Thailand, but it fails to explain why the FTA negotiations remained 
motionless. Finally, although democratization is a central guiding principle for the United 
States, the Bush and Obama administrations were only willing to make soft democratic 
pushes. The counterfactual to democratization theory suggests that U.S. officials are 
purposely waiting for Thailand to develop its own Thai-style democracy without U.S. 
influence, thinking that homegrown systems may be more resilient in the long run or 
calculating that the United States will have more opportunities to influence democratic 
consolidation in Thailand if it maintains stable ties. 
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How have Thailand’s two most recent coups d’état in 2006 and 2014 affected 
U.S.-Thai relations? Why has the United States not exerted more pressure on its long-
term ally—which has been one of only a few countries to democratize in Southeast 
Asia—to return to democracy? The United States ostensibly sidelined its advocacy for 
democracy, which has long been and continues to be a key platform of U.S. foreign 
policy, by responding to the coups d’état with only slightly reduced security-related 
activity, continued economic engagement, and mild diplomatic action. These measured 
steps judiciously sought to maintain the U.S. alliance with Thailand and preserve the 
United States’ hegemonic influence in the region. In response to the suspension of some 
types of U.S. military aid, Thai leaders did not hesitate to show the United States that 
they had other options. As a middle-power state, Thailand tilted the balance just enough 
to concern U.S. officials at a time when the United States sought to rebalance to Asia.  
Testing theories against real-world events helps validate theoretical claims. 
Applying three broad theoretical frameworks—balance of power, alliance theory, and 
democratization—to the U.S.-Thailand relationship exposed factors that influenced the 
behavior of both states. First, this thesis analyzed the bilateral economic, security, and 
diplomatic conditions that existed before and after the 2006 and 2014 coups. Then, the 
areas that shifted were evaluated in light of balance of power, alliance, and 
democratization theories. Balance of power theory provided the most compelling 
explanation for the mild U.S. responses to both the 2006 and 2014 coups. Additionally, 
security cooperation appeared to be highly valued by leaders of both countries. Although 
democratization of a key ally was important to the United States, it was overshadowed by 
a perceived emerging security threat in the region. The United States behaved as if it 
were concerned about losing influence with Thailand to China, primarily in the security 
realm and secondarily in both economic and diplomatic relations. 
Thailand’s coups triggered a congressionally mandated U.S. response within the 
United States predicated on the established foreign policy of promoting democratization 
abroad, but the U.S. administration tempered this requirement. According to U.S. foreign 
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policy, when a foreign country removes a democratically elected leader, Congress 
mandates the immediate suspension of military assistance to that state. Following 
Thailand’s 2006 and 2014 coups, members of Congress proposed to rescind Thailand’s 
major non-NATO ally status, but both the Bush and Obama administrations overruled 
these proposals. There also were calls to cancel or significantly scale back the annual 
Cobra Gold military exercises led by Thailand and the United States. Yet, these exercises 
went on, with the slightly reduced participation of the U.S. military best explained by the 
more pressing need for military personnel in Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Korea. The 
U.S. executive branch made calculated decisions to remain faithful to its long-term ally, 
and Congress seemed to accept that maintaining a strong alliance was in the United 
States’ best interest.  
The United States’ soft push for a return to democracy came as a surprise. Within 
the region, Thailand and the Philippines are the only two states with relatively long 
histories of democratization. On mainland Southeast Asia, Thailand has been the only 
surely democratizing state. With the administration’s impetus to promote democracy 
abroad as evidenced in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States could not ignore 
Thailand’s democratic setback. U.S. officials publicly condemned the coups and 
encouraged Thailand’s military regime to restore democracy. However, U.S. officials 
worked to demonstrate their long-term commitment to Thailand and the region. The 
United States relaxed its push for democracy and, to a large degree, maintained bilateral 
economic, security, and diplomatic cooperation at pre-coup levels.  
While the United States applied some pressure on Thailand following each coups, 
Thai leaders explored other alternatives to the United States. Unilaterally, Thailand can 
defend its own sovereignty, but historically it has predominately relied on alliances and 
diplomacy to fend off colonialism and communism. The U.S.-Thailand alliance has been 
central to Thailand’s defense since the Cold War, and bilateral trade and U.S. FDI in 
Thailand have been robust. Despite this, following suspensions of U.S. military aid after 
each coup, Thailand assertively pursued its economic, security, and diplomatic options 
with China, Russia, and ASEAN as secondary partners to communicate to the United 
States that it was not Thailand’s only option. China and Russia took advantage of the 
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situation and provided Thailand with alternatives to the status quo relationship with the 
United States by offering arms sales and, in the case of China, bilateral military exercises. 
A multilateral approach with ASEAN could work economically for Thailand, especially 
since the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015. However, 
ASEAN is not a true alliance in that it lacks significant security cooperation. Thailand’s 
most effective option appears to be playing larger powers against one another, which it 
can do given its status as a strategically important middle power. Thailand has a history 
of playing states off each other, and the current regime appears to follow the same path. 
The United States is well aware that China and Russia have aggressively pursued 
enhanced security and economic relations with Thailand since the two recent coups. 
When the U.S. government suspended $29 million in military aid to Thailand following 
the 2006 coup, China stepped in and provided a $49 million security package.335 
Currently, China continues to assist Thailand with military aid, weapons and equipment 
sales, military student exchanges, and bilateral exercises.336 More recently, Thai leaders 
engaged with Russia, another great power, to show that they have other options.337 
Although the United States remains the preferred security partner, Thai leaders are 
negotiating with both China and Russia for submarines, helicopters, and tanks. The 
United States identifies both China and Russia as strategic competitors, but Thailand 
appears to see them as reliable security and economic partners that do not interfere with 
Thailand’s internal matters. Anthony Davis, a security analyst for HIS-Jane’s, reported 
that Thailand’s foreign policy appears to be redirecting away from the West and closer to 
China and Russia, both of which are challenging the hegemonic power of the United 
States.338 Thailand’s warming relations with other large powers have upset the balance of 
                                                 
335 Ehrlich, “China Muscling U.S. Aside in Thailand”; Chanlett-Avery, Thailand: Background and 
U.S. Relations (CRS Report No. RL32593) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 14–
15, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32593.pdf. 
336 Ehrlich, “China Muscling U.S. Aside in Thailand”; Ehrlich ,“Thailand Nears $1 Billion Submarine 
Deal”; Ehrlich ,“U.S. Sees China and Thailand Strengthen Military Relations”; Ehrlich, “China-Thailand 
Joint Military Exercise.” 
337 Belford, “Junta-Ruled Thailand Flirts with Russia”; Wong-Anan and Nanuam, “Regime Seeks 
Russia’s Backing”; Nanuam, “Russia Offers to Build Armaments Plant in Thailand.” 
338 Wong-Anan and Nanuam, “Regime Seeks Russia’s Backing.”  
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power, explaining in large part why the United States did not exert greater pressure on 
Thailand to return to democracy.  
While the current Thai regime is attempting to secure its legitimacy at home and 
abroad, it is also confronted with a less secure alliance with the United States. After 
Thailand’s 2014 coup, the U.S.-Thailand relationship appeared to cool off after public 
criticism from U.S. officials and the subsequent suspension of military aid. Pavin 
Chachavalpongpun claims that both the United States and China are competing for 
strategic ties with Thailand.339 Thus far, Thailand has a relatively solid relationship with 
both countries. However, a closer Sino-Thailand relationship poses a significant dilemma 
for the United States in its strategy to rebalance to Asia. The U.S. ability to rely on 
Thailand has been compromised by the country’s political turmoil. Thai leaders have 
appeared distracted by domestic turmoil over the past decade and less able to assist with 
the U.S. rebalance strategy. Despite U.S.-Thailand tensions, it appears that the most 
favorable option for both countries is to continue their alliance, but for the United States, 
maintaining the balance of power is also important.  
Overall, the bilateral relationship appears to be on an upward trajectory and 
should be expected to remain favorable, but the United States should not overestimate its 
own worth or underestimate Thailand’s resolve. The 183-year friendship appears durable 
and can be expected to endure well into the future, but it should not be taken for granted, 
especially when Thailand is willing to dance with other partners. Thailand demonstrated 
that it is willing to explore security and economic cooperation with other larger powers, 
especially with U.S. competitors. While the U.S. responses to both coups were virtually 
the same, Thailand’s balancing behavior should also be expected to continue, especially 
if U.S. foreign policy continues to mandate a suspension of military aid. The U.S. 
government has demonstrated that it is willing to cultivate bilateral relationships even 
with nondemocratic governments, most recently with Vietnam to increase security 
cooperation against regional maritime disputes involving China.340 In short, security 
                                                 
339 Chachavalpongpun, “Competing Diplomacies.” 
340 “Fact Sheet: United States-Vietnam Relations,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, 23 
May 2016, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/23/fact-sheet-united-states-vietnam-relations. 
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concerns—especially those related to balance of power—appear to trump other factors in 
the U.S.-Thailand partnership, even pushing to the wayside the long-held, ideological 
desire of the United States to promote democracy abroad. 
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